pi-ai's auth model reaches this adapter through three translations, all
of which live here: a CredentialStore over the harness credential
records, an AuthContext over the credential plane and the host
filesystem, and one authorization flow per installed provider that
ships a login. The seams they consume name nothing from pi-ai, so a
second adapter family can arrive with a different auth model and share
them.
Every collection is now built with the store and the context rather
than with nothing, which is what makes a signed-in provider stay signed
in across the collection rebuild a configuration change causes. With a
posture that works, the configurable-provider directory no longer
withholds OAuth-only routes and `openai-codex` is offered again; the
predicate that withheld it is gone.
The credential plane stays optional. Reads answer "nothing stored"
without a credentials service because such a composition genuinely
holds no credential, while writes refuse by name — a login whose grant
evaporated would report success and then fail every request. Flow
registration is scoped to the authorization seam, so a headless or ACP
composition mounts with no sign-in and everything else unchanged.
Two fixes found while wiring this up: pre-release credential fixtures
in the llm suites still used the flat document the record work
replaced, and a flow that ignores its cancellation signal would have
held its key for the life of the process — withdrawal now settles the
attempt either way.
Some credentials cannot be configured, only obtained: getting one means
a conversation — open this page, paste that code, pick an account. The
new seam owns that conversation and the one-attempt-per-key lifecycle,
and never the protocol, so a second authorization protocol arrives as
another flow rather than as another seam.
A flow is registered under the CredentialKey it writes, which is also
how the seam knows which plugin answers for the format inside that
record. The flow owns the write: run() resolving means the record is
already committed through ctx.credentials, and the seam confirms it.
That keeps a library persisting through its own store adapter the
single writer instead of being copied back out and written twice.
The interaction travels with the request rather than a registry,
because whoever starts an authorization is the one who can talk to the
human about it. A request already withdrawn never claims the key and
never starts the flow — relying on each flow to check its signal before
the first await would let one that does not hang holding the key.
The seam answered one question — what is behind this environment-variable
name — and that shape cannot hold what an authorization grant is: a
multi-field, rotating value keyed by a provider id rather than by a POSIX
identifier. The Models page already works around the gap by inventing a
synthetic environment name (`MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY`) for a route the user added
by hand, because the store's key must look like one.
`CredentialKey` is `<scope>/<id>`, where the scope is the owning plugin's
registered name. The owner is in the key because a `grant` payload is written
in its owner's format: two plugins serving the same provider name would
otherwise read each other's payload, and a record left by an uninstalled
plugin could not be told from a live one. The `/` also keeps the grammar
disjoint from `CredentialRef`, so the key spaces cannot collide.
`CredentialRecord` is `api-key` (key and/or provider environment values) or
`grant` (an opaque, owner-owned payload). The asymmetry is deliberate: an api
key is the harness's own data, a grant is a package it carries for someone
else. `modifyRecord` is the only write path because a correct write depends
on the current value — a token refresh is read-decide-replace under one
cross-process lock, without which two processes rotating one refresh token
lose whichever wrote first.
`.credentials.yaml` becomes a versioned two-section document. The pre-release
flat layout is refused by name, with the entry count and the one edit needed,
rather than read as an empty store — which would surface as an authentication
failure on the first request instead of at load. A grant payload is admitted
in both directions, so a value the document could not read back exactly as
written is refused rather than stored lossily.
ProjectionDefinition lost its persist?: boolean opt-in when every
projection unit became uniformly checkpointed, but the subsystem doc's
type-equiv paste still carried the field, so verify-type-equiv drifted
from packages/session/session-projection/src/index.ts. Remove the field
and its JSDoc from both language sides and re-record the bilingual
pairing record.
Drop the persist?: boolean opt-in: every unit's state — client-visible and
host-only alike — is now written to the projection cache. A unit can no
longer silently skip the durable cache, host-only units no longer need an
explicit flag to participate in cold restore, and the persist-sharing
conflict check disappears with the field.
- ProjectionDefinition/ErasedDefinition lose persist; register overloads
simplify; checkpoint/restoreFloor/restore fold every registered unit.
- Registry and cache tests drop the persist:true fixtures and the
persistence-policy sharing test.
- READMEs and the state-and-client-views note record the uniform rule;
cordis API catalog and subsystem signatures regenerated.
An image with a side above the deployed routes' 2000px many-image bound
could be durably committed by read_image, ride every later request, and
permanently fail the session with provider 400s. Admission now enforces a
configurable maxImageDimension (default 2000) during the full decode, so
read_image surfaces a recoverable tool error naming the limit instead of
poisoning durable history; the Web composer gets dedicated copy for the
new IMAGE_DIMENSION_TOO_LARGE reason.
Fixes#2626
