deepseek-harness/packages/process/process-local/src/spawn.ts

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/**
* Process plumbing for the local process manager: detached process-group
* spawn, tail-keep output with spill files, and SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation.
* This layer reacts to an abort signal; callers own deadlines and classify
* causes.
* @module dsh-process-local/spawn
*/
import { type ChildProcessByStdio, spawn } from 'node:child_process'
import type { Readable, Writable } from 'node:stream'
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
import { closeSync, mkdtempSync, openSync, unlinkSync, writeSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { DSH_ENV_PREFIX } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-process'
import type { CollectedOutput, DshEnvironment, ProcessHandle, ProcessOutcome, ProcessSpawnSpec } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-process'
/**
* Credential-shaped env vars are NOT forwarded to children (the harness's
* own DEEPSEEK_API_KEY must not leak into `env` output, tool results, or
* spill files). Same default pattern as Codex's env policy; a future config
* can whitelist specific vars when a workflow genuinely needs one.
*/
export const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
/**
* Build a child environment from scrubbed ambient values, ordinary caller
* entries, and a managed `DSH_*` snapshot. Ambient managed names are removed;
* ordinary and managed entries reject the other channel's namespace before
* `dshEnv` merges last.
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/agent-session-jsonl-location # Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/bash.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-hook-bridges.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.1.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.2.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/session.jsonl # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/mode-switching/session.jsonl # packages/bash/bash-local/README.md # packages/bash/bash-local/src/run.ts # packages/bash/bash-local/tests/run.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash/README.md # packages/bash/tool-bash/README.md # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts # packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl/src/index.ts # packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite/src/index.ts # packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/README.md # packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/src/index.ts # packages/ui/acp-agent/README.md # packages/ui/stdio-agent/README.md
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* @param extra - caller entries; `DSH_*` names are rejected.
* @param dshEnv - managed entries; non-`DSH_*` names are rejected.
* @returns the environment to hand to `spawn` for the child process.
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
*/
export function childEnv(
extra?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
dshEnv?: DshEnvironment,
): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
if (!SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN.test(key) && !key.startsWith(DSH_ENV_PREFIX)) env[key] = value
}
for (const key of Object.keys(extra ?? {})) {
if (key.startsWith(DSH_ENV_PREFIX)) {
throw new Error(`ordinary child env cannot set reserved variable "${key}"; use dshEnv`)
}
}
for (const key of Object.keys(dshEnv ?? {})) {
if (!key.startsWith(DSH_ENV_PREFIX)) {
throw new Error(`managed child env cannot set ordinary variable "${key}"; use env`)
}
}
return { ...env, ...extra, ...dshEnv }
}
Expose audited hardcoded tunables as plugin config The audit swept every packages/*/* plugin for the new AGENTS.md convention (no hardcoded tunables in plugins) and exposes each finding as a defaulted, validated Config field. Defaults are the previously hardcoded values throughout, so no deployment or golden changes. - tool-fs (had NO Config): readLimit, readMaxLineLength, readMaxBytes, readStreamMinSize. The caps thread through ReadToolCaps/ReadWindow — read-render already documented that the consumer applies the caps, so they become explicit per-request fields. - tool-web: searchMaxResults (WEB_SEARCH_MAX_RESULTS stays as the schemastery default). Also fixes the stale GREP_LIMIT references in search.ts and the web-capability-seam RFC (no such constant exists). - bash-local: graceMs (SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation grace). The RunInternals.graceMs test seam is gone: graceMs is now a required SpawnSpec field filled from config, so tests exercise the real config path and the defaults live in exactly one place. - subagent-acp: disposeEofGraceMs / disposeGraceMs. The AcpRunSpec fields become required for the same one-defaulting-layer reason. - session-persistence-sqlite: journalMode ('wal' default; the rollback-journal modes serve filesystems where WAL's shared-memory files do not work, e.g. network mounts). - hooks-claude + hooks-codex: stderrSummaryMaxChars for the persisted hook/result stderr summary. The duplicated summarize() helpers merge into hook-protocol's summarizeStderr(stderr, maxChars), beside the HookResultRecord field it feeds, with the bound parameterized the same way runHook's defaultTimeoutMs already is. - compact-basic: charsPerToken for the token estimator (default 4, the English-text heuristic; CJK-heavy deployments need ~1-2 or compaction fires far too late). Also corrects the BasicCompactService class doc, which claimed defaults the required-field config never had. - fs-local: deletes the dead STREAM_MIN_SIZE constant and the dead FsIoInternals.streamMinSize seam — the read-routing bound lives in the consumer (tool-fs), where it is now config. This is item 1 of the proposed prune-write-only-fs-surface RFC, annotated accordingly. Every new field gets range validation (following the existing assertPositiveFinite pattern), a README row, and tests covering the configured behavior, the schema default, and load-time rejection.
2026-07-04 17:37:23 +08:00
/** Injectable knobs so tests can exercise spill behavior without the OS tmpdir. */
export interface SpawnInternals {
/** Directory for spill files (defaults to the OS temp dir). */
spillDir?: string
}
let spillCounter = 0
let defaultSpillDir: string | undefined
/**
* The default spill location: a private (0700) per-process directory under
* the OS tmpdir, created lazily. Predictable world-readable paths would let
* other local users read command output or pre-create symlinks.
*/
function privateSpillDir(): string {
defaultSpillDir ??= mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-proc-'))
return defaultSpillDir
}
/**
* Collects one stream with a bounded in-memory tail. On first overflow a
* spill file is created and every chunk (including those already collected)
* is appended there while the full stream remains within `maxSpillBytes`.
*
* Tail-keep rationale (pi/OpenCode): errors and final results cluster at the
* end of command output; the spill file covers the head.
*/
export class OutputCollector {
private chunks: Buffer[] = []
private bytes = 0
private dropped = false
private spillFd: number | undefined
private spillFile: string | undefined
private spillDisabled = false
/** Total bytes ever pushed (not just retained). */
private total = 0
constructor(
private readonly maxBytes: number,
private readonly maxSpillBytes: number,
private readonly label: string,
private readonly spillDir: string,
) {}
/**
* Ingest one stream chunk, counting it toward the whole-stream total. On
* first overflow of the in-memory cap a spill file is opened and every chunk
* (already-collected ones included) is appended there from then on; the
* in-memory tail then drops whole chunks from its head (or the head of a
* single over-cap chunk) until it fits the cap again.
* @param chunk - the raw bytes from one stream 'data' event.
*/
push(chunk: Buffer): void {
this.total += chunk.length
const overflows = this.bytes + chunk.length > this.maxBytes
if (!this.spillDisabled && (overflows || this.spillFd !== undefined)) this.spillAll(chunk)
this.chunks.push(chunk)
this.bytes += chunk.length
while (this.bytes > this.maxBytes && this.chunks.length > 1) {
// Drop whole chunks from the head; pipe chunks are small (≤64KiB), so
// the retained tail tracks the cap closely enough for a model-facing
// truncation boundary. (length > 1 was just checked — shift() returns.)
const head = this.chunks.shift() as Buffer
this.bytes -= head.length
this.dropped = true
}
if (this.bytes > this.maxBytes && this.chunks.length === 1) {
// A single chunk larger than the cap: keep its tail.
const only = this.chunks[0] as Buffer
this.chunks[0] = only.subarray(only.length - this.maxBytes)
this.bytes = this.maxBytes
this.dropped = true
}
}
/** Open the spill file lazily and append `chunk` (and any prior chunks once). */
private spillAll(chunk: Buffer): void {
if (this.total > this.maxSpillBytes) {
this.discardSpill()
return
}
if (this.spillFd === undefined) {
// Random suffix + O_EXCL + no-follow-equivalent ('wx' fails on any
// existing path, symlink or not) + owner-only mode: defeats spill-path
// prediction and symlink planting in shared tmp dirs.
this.spillFile = join(
this.spillDir,
`dsh-proc-${process.pid}-${++spillCounter}-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}-${this.label}.log`,
)
this.spillFd = openSync(this.spillFile, 'wx', 0o600)
for (const prior of this.chunks) writeSync(this.spillFd, prior)
}
writeSync(this.spillFd, chunk)
}
/** Stop spilling and remove the file once it can no longer hold the complete stream. */
private discardSpill(): void {
const fd = this.spillFd
const file = this.spillFile
this.spillFd = undefined
this.spillFile = undefined
this.spillDisabled = true
if (fd !== undefined) {
try {
closeSync(fd)
} catch {
// Retain the descriptor so finalize can retry the failed close.
this.spillFd = fd
}
}
if (file !== undefined) {
try {
unlinkSync(file)
} catch {
// A failed unlink leaves at most maxSpillBytes behind, never an unbounded file.
}
}
}
/**
* Incremental read in whole-stream byte coordinates: returns everything
* pushed since `fromByte`. When `fromByte` has already slid out of the
* in-memory tail window, the read is `lossy` — it returns the whole
* retained tail and the gap is only recoverable from the spill file.
* @param fromByte - whole-stream offset to resume from (a prior read's `nextOffset`; 0 for the first read).
* @returns the delta text, the offset for the next read, the `lossy` flag, and the spill path when one was created.
*/
readFrom(fromByte: number): { text: string; nextOffset: number; lossy: boolean; spillPath?: string } {
const windowStart = this.total - this.bytes
const buffer = Buffer.concat(this.chunks)
const lossy = fromByte < windowStart
const slice = lossy ? buffer : buffer.subarray(fromByte - windowStart)
return {
text: slice.toString('utf8'),
nextOffset: this.total,
lossy,
...this.spillFile !== undefined ? { spillPath: this.spillFile } : {},
}
}
/**
* Close the spill file (if any) and return the final output. A failed close
* (delayed writeback fault) stops advertising the spill path — the file may
* be missing its tail — but still returns the in-memory result.
* @returns the final collected output: tail text, truncation flag, and the spill path when intact.
*/
finalize(): CollectedOutput {
if (this.spillFd !== undefined) {
try {
closeSync(this.spillFd)
} catch {
// A delayed writeback failure makes the spill unreliable; keep finalize
// total but stop advertising that file.
this.spillFile = undefined
}
this.spillFd = undefined
}
return {
text: Buffer.concat(this.chunks).toString('utf8'),
truncated: this.dropped,
...this.spillFile !== undefined ? { spillPath: this.spillFile } : {},
}
}
}
/**
* Send `sig` to a detached process group. Never throws: delivery races process
* exit and may run in a timer callback, so failures are contained and a
* non-positive pid is a no-op.
* @param pid - the group leader's pid; non-positive means the spawn failed and the call is a no-op.
* @param sig - the signal to deliver to the whole group.
*/
export function killGroup(pid: number, sig: NodeJS.Signals): void {
if (pid <= 0) return
try {
process.kill(-pid, sig)
} catch {
// Swallow: see contract above.
}
}
/**
* Spawn one isolated detached process group and collect its output.
* Runtime exits resolve as {@link ProcessOutcome}; only spawn failures reject.
* @param spec - fully resolved argv, cwd, limits, and cancellation.
* @param internals - test-only spill-directory override.
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* @returns live process handle and outcome promise.
*/
export function spawnProcess(spec: ProcessSpawnSpec, internals: SpawnInternals = {}): ProcessHandle {
const spillDir = internals.spillDir ?? privateSpillDir()
if (spec.signal?.aborted) {
throw new Error(`aborted before spawn: ${String(spec.signal.reason ?? 'aborted')}`)
}
const [program, ...args] = spec.argv
if (program === undefined || program.length === 0) {
throw new Error('invalid argv: expected a non-empty program name at argv[0]')
}
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// Keep absent stdin as /dev/null; literal tuples preserve non-null output types.
const env = childEnv(spec.env, spec.dshEnv)
const child: ChildProcessByStdio<Writable | null, Readable, Readable> = spec.stdin !== undefined
? spawn(program, args, { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
: spawn(program, args, { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
const stdout = new OutputCollector(spec.stdoutMaxBytes, spec.maxSpillBytes, 'stdout', spillDir)
const stderr = new OutputCollector(spec.stderrMaxBytes, spec.maxSpillBytes, 'stderr', spillDir)
child.stdout.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { stdout.push(chunk) })
child.stderr.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { stderr.push(chunk) })
let graceTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined
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// Failed spawns use pid -1 so kill remains a no-op.
const pid = child.pid ?? -1
const kill = (): void => {
if (graceTimer !== undefined) return // escalation already in flight
killGroup(pid, 'SIGTERM')
Expose audited hardcoded tunables as plugin config The audit swept every packages/*/* plugin for the new AGENTS.md convention (no hardcoded tunables in plugins) and exposes each finding as a defaulted, validated Config field. Defaults are the previously hardcoded values throughout, so no deployment or golden changes. - tool-fs (had NO Config): readLimit, readMaxLineLength, readMaxBytes, readStreamMinSize. The caps thread through ReadToolCaps/ReadWindow — read-render already documented that the consumer applies the caps, so they become explicit per-request fields. - tool-web: searchMaxResults (WEB_SEARCH_MAX_RESULTS stays as the schemastery default). Also fixes the stale GREP_LIMIT references in search.ts and the web-capability-seam RFC (no such constant exists). - bash-local: graceMs (SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation grace). The RunInternals.graceMs test seam is gone: graceMs is now a required SpawnSpec field filled from config, so tests exercise the real config path and the defaults live in exactly one place. - subagent-acp: disposeEofGraceMs / disposeGraceMs. The AcpRunSpec fields become required for the same one-defaulting-layer reason. - session-persistence-sqlite: journalMode ('wal' default; the rollback-journal modes serve filesystems where WAL's shared-memory files do not work, e.g. network mounts). - hooks-claude + hooks-codex: stderrSummaryMaxChars for the persisted hook/result stderr summary. The duplicated summarize() helpers merge into hook-protocol's summarizeStderr(stderr, maxChars), beside the HookResultRecord field it feeds, with the bound parameterized the same way runHook's defaultTimeoutMs already is. - compact-basic: charsPerToken for the token estimator (default 4, the English-text heuristic; CJK-heavy deployments need ~1-2 or compaction fires far too late). Also corrects the BasicCompactService class doc, which claimed defaults the required-field config never had. - fs-local: deletes the dead STREAM_MIN_SIZE constant and the dead FsIoInternals.streamMinSize seam — the read-routing bound lives in the consumer (tool-fs), where it is now config. This is item 1 of the proposed prune-write-only-fs-surface RFC, annotated accordingly. Every new field gets range validation (following the existing assertPositiveFinite pattern), a README row, and tests covering the configured behavior, the schema default, and load-time rejection.
2026-07-04 17:37:23 +08:00
graceTimer = setTimeout(() => { killGroup(pid, 'SIGKILL') }, spec.graceMs)
}
// The caller owns timeout classification; this layer only reacts to abort.
const onAbort = (): void => { kill() }
spec.signal?.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true })
2026-07-12 03:36:43 +08:00
// Stdin writes are best-effort; process exit and captured output remain authoritative.
if (child.stdin !== null) {
child.stdin.on('error', () => { /* stdin write is best-effort; outcome rides on exit/output. */ })
child.stdin.end(spec.stdin)
}
const done = new Promise<ProcessOutcome>((resolve, reject) => {
let settled = false
let pipeDrainTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined
const settle = (exitCode: number | null, signal: NodeJS.Signals | null): void => {
if (settled) return
settled = true
child.stdout.destroy()
child.stderr.destroy()
cleanup()
resolve({
exitCode,
signal,
stdout: stdout.finalize(),
stderr: stderr.finalize(),
})
}
child.on('error', (error) => {
// No meaningful close outcome follows a spawn failure.
settled = true
cleanup()
reject(error)
})
child.on('exit', (exitCode, signal) => {
pipeDrainTimer = setTimeout(() => { settle(exitCode, signal) }, spec.graceMs)
})
child.on('close', settle)
function cleanup(): void {
if (graceTimer !== undefined) clearTimeout(graceTimer)
if (pipeDrainTimer !== undefined) clearTimeout(pipeDrainTimer)
spec.signal?.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort)
}
})
return { pid, stdout, stderr, done, kill }
}