deepseek-harness/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/runner.spec.ts

/**
 * End-to-end runner tests: spawn the REAL runner entry through tsx (exactly
 * the argv shape dsh-sandbox-local's confine() builds), with piped stdio
 * inherited through the runner into the confined child — the same chain a
 * production confined execution walks.
 */

import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'

import { resolvePwshPath } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local'
import { AclWriteGrant } from '../src/index.ts'

const isWin32 = process.platform === 'win32'
const runnerEntry = fileURLToPath(new URL('../src/runner.ts', import.meta.url))

// Functional probe, not where.exe: spawnSync never throws on a missing
// binary (status null) and where.exe exits 1 without pwsh — only an actual
// pwsh invocation's exit status is truth.
function pwshAvailable(): boolean {
  return spawnSync(resolvePwshPath(), ['-NoLogo', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-Command', '$true'], { encoding: 'utf8' }).status === 0
}

function runRunner(args: string[], timeoutMs = 30_000) {
  return spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--import', 'tsx/esm', runnerEntry, ...args], {
    timeout: timeoutMs,
    encoding: 'utf8',
  })
}

describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => {
  let scratchRoot!: string
  let writableDir!: string
  let isolatedTemp!: string
  let secretFile!: string
  let escapeFile!: string
  // The ambient-writable probe target: a subdirectory of C:\Users\Public.
  // INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are absent from BOTH restricting lists, so the Public
  // tree's INTERACTIVE grant must NOT satisfy the write check — the ambient
  // boundary the dual-list design closes (bot-reported blind spot). The
  // Public tree may be unavailable or unwritable for the test user on some
  // hosts; the probe test skips itself when the directory cannot be created.
  let publicProbeDir: string | undefined

  beforeAll(() => {
    scratchRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-runner-'))
    writableDir = join(scratchRoot, 'writable')
    mkdirSync(writableDir)
    isolatedTemp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-runner-temp-'))
    secretFile = join(scratchRoot, 'secret.txt')
    writeFileSync(secretFile, 'top secret - must stay readable to prove the read boundary')
    escapeFile = join(scratchRoot, 'escaped.txt')
    try {
      publicProbeDir = mkdtempSync(join(process.env.PUBLIC ?? 'C:\\Users\\Public', 'dsh-acl-public-'))
    } catch {
      publicProbeDir = undefined
    }
  })

  afterAll(() => {
    rmSync(scratchRoot, { recursive: true, force: true })
    rmSync(isolatedTemp, { recursive: true, force: true })
    if (publicProbeDir !== undefined) rmSync(publicProbeDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
  })

  it('workspace-write: the confined child writes granted directories only', () => {
    const probe = [
      "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
      // The restricted token puts pwsh into ConstrainedLanguage in BOTH modes
      // (documented Known Limitation) — pinned here so a token change that
      // silently restores FullLanguage is caught.
      '\'LANGMODE: \' + $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode;',
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TARGET-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TARGET-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${isolatedTemp}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${escapeFile}' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'ESCAPE-WRITE: OK (ESCAPE!)'}catch{'ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
      `try{Get-Content '${secretFile}' -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'SECRET-READ: OK'}catch{'SECRET-READ: DENIED'};`,
      // Authenticated Users is absent from BOTH lists: the WMI namespace
      // security check fails (0x80041003) — CIM is unavailable under every
      // confined mode (the documented contract; the C:\-root tree-creation
      // escape is closed in both as the other side of the trade).
      "try{Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'CIM: OK'}catch{'CIM: DENIED'}",
    ].join('')
    const result = runRunner([
      '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write',
      '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
    ])
    expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('LANGMODE: ConstrainedLanguage')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('SECRET-READ: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('CIM: DENIED')
    expect(existsSync(escapeFile)).toBe(false)
    expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'child-wrote.txt'))).toBe(true)
  }, 30_000)

  it('read-only: strict zero grants — no writes anywhere (not even NUL), reads and $null redirection fine, CIM unavailable', () => {
    const probe = [
      "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
      '\'LANGMODE: \' + $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode;',
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\readonly-child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TARGET-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TARGET-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${isolatedTemp}\\readonly-child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
      // The NUL device is a securable object: strict zero grants deny it too.
      'try{Set-Content -Path \'NUL\' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;\'NUL-WRITE: OK\'}catch{\'NUL-WRITE: DENIED\'};',
      // PowerShell's $null redirection discards without opening NUL — must keep working.
      'echo hi > $null;\'DOLLAR-NULL: OK\';',
      `try{Get-Content '${secretFile}' -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'SECRET-READ: OK'}catch{'SECRET-READ: DENIED'};`,
      // BOTH lists drop Authenticated Users: the WMI namespace security
      // check fails (0x80041003) — the documented CIM boundary of every
      // confined mode, the price of the zero ambient-write surface.
      "try{Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'CIM: OK'}catch{'CIM: DENIED'}",
    ].join('')
    const result = runRunner([
      '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'read-only',
      '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
    ])
    expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('LANGMODE: ConstrainedLanguage')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: DENIED')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: DENIED')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('NUL-WRITE: DENIED')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('DOLLAR-NULL: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('SECRET-READ: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('CIM: DENIED')
    expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'readonly-child-wrote.txt'))).toBe(false)
  }, 30_000)

  it('workspace-write: Remove-Item and Rename-Item succeed in the granted workspace (DELETE + FILE_DELETE_CHILD)', () => {
    // Deleting a file and renaming a directory both hit the second access
    // check on the workspace itself: the grant must carry DELETE (on the
    // object) and FILE_DELETE_CHILD (on its parent).
    const victimFile = join(writableDir, 'delete-me.txt')
    writeFileSync(victimFile, 'remove me')
    const victimDir = join(writableDir, 'rename-me')
    mkdirSync(victimDir)
    const renamedDir = join(writableDir, 'renamed-by-child')
    const probe = [
      "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
      `try{Remove-Item -LiteralPath '${victimFile}' -ErrorAction Stop;'DELETE-FILE: OK'}catch{'DELETE-FILE: DENIED'};`,
      `try{Rename-Item -LiteralPath '${victimDir}' -NewName 'renamed-by-child' -ErrorAction Stop;'RENAME-DIR: OK'}catch{'RENAME-DIR: DENIED'}`,
    ].join('')
    const result = runRunner([
      '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write',
      '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
    ])
    expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('DELETE-FILE: OK')
    expect(result.stdout).toContain('RENAME-DIR: OK')
    expect(existsSync(victimFile)).toBe(false)
    expect(existsSync(renamedDir)).toBe(true)
  }, 30_000)

  it('--write-sid: the runner trusts the caller-owned grants — private temp subdir via the TMP/TEMP env rewrite, no grants of its own', () => {
    const writeSid = 'S-1-4-9000-99'
    const privateTemp = join(isolatedTemp, 'private-subdir')
    mkdirSync(privateTemp)
    const grant = AclWriteGrant.create(writeSid)
    grant.add(privateTemp)
    try {
      const probe = [
        "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
        `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\server-granted.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'WORKSPACE-WRITE: OK'}catch{'WORKSPACE-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
        `try{Set-Content -Path '${privateTemp}\\server-granted.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'PRIVATE-TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'PRIVATE-TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
        "'TEMP-ENV: ' + $env:TEMP;",
        "'TMP-ENV: ' + $env:TMP",
      ].join('')
      const result = runRunner([
        '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', privateTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write', '--write-sid', writeSid,
        '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
      ])
      expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
      // The runner granted nothing (only the caller's private-temp grant
      // stands): the workspace write is denied, the private temp write lands,
      // and the child's TMP/TEMP point at the private subdirectory.
      expect(result.stdout).toContain('WORKSPACE-WRITE: DENIED')
      expect(result.stdout).toContain('PRIVATE-TEMP-WRITE: OK')
      expect(result.stdout).toContain(`TEMP-ENV: ${privateTemp}`)
      expect(result.stdout).toContain(`TMP-ENV: ${privateTemp}`)
      expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'server-granted.txt'))).toBe(false)
      expect(existsSync(join(privateTemp, 'server-granted.txt'))).toBe(true)
    } finally {
      grant.dispose()
      rmSync(privateTemp, { recursive: true, force: true })
    }
  }, 30_000)

  it('confined children spawn grandchildren with inherited stdio; piped capture stays denied (named-pipe default SD template)', () => {
    // Two-layer pin of the grandchild-spawn boundary:
    //  - the token default DACL carries a restricting-SID ACE (set in init),
    //    so ANONYMOUS pipe creation (CreatePipe — the token-default-DACL
    //    consumer) works and inherited/ignored stdio spawns succeed;
    //  - libuv's pipe-stdio uses NAMED pipes, whose default security
    //    descriptor is the Win32 layer's user-mode default SD template
    //    (built by KernelBase — owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS
    //    read-only) — NOT the token default DACL, which is what the kernel
    //    applies to a raw SD-null create — so the client-end open requests
    //    write access no restricting SID is
    //    granted: ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, surfaced as spawn EPERM. That is the
    //    POC-documented "no output redirection" boundary of WRITE_RESTRICTED
    //    tokens; piped capture cannot work and is pinned as DENIED.
    const probe = [
      "const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');",
      "const t = (name, opts) => { const s = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['-e', '1'], { encoding: 'utf8', ...opts }); console.log(name + ':' + (s.status === 0 ? 'OK' : 'DENIED')); };",
      "t('inherit', { stdio: 'inherit' });",
      "t('ignore', { stdio: 'ignore' });",
      "t('pipe', { stdio: 'pipe' });",
    ].join('')
    for (const mode of ['workspace-write', 'read-only'] as const) {
      const result = runRunner([
        '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', mode,
        '--', 'node', '-e', probe,
      ])
      expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
      expect(result.stdout, `mode: ${mode}`).toContain('inherit:OK')
      expect(result.stdout, `mode: ${mode}`).toContain('ignore:OK')
      expect(result.stdout, `mode: ${mode}`).toContain('pipe:DENIED')
    }
  }, 30_000)

  it('mode-downgrade leak regression: a STANDING workspace grant is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade', () => {
    // The reported defect: a session that materialized its grant in
    // workspace-write keeps the ACE standing for the server lifetime. After
    // switching to read-only, the restricted token's read-only list must carry NO
    // orphan SID — the standing ACE stays but the pass-2 check cannot use
    // it, so the workspace write is denied (previously it LEAKED). The
    // switch back reuses the SAME standing ACE: the re-upgrade write lands
    // without any re-grant.
    const writeSid = 'S-1-4-9001-7'
    const grant = AclWriteGrant.create(writeSid)
    grant.add(writableDir)
    try {
      const downgradeProbe = [
        "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
        `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\downgraded.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'DOWNGRADE-WRITE: OK (LEAK!)'}catch{'DOWNGRADE-WRITE: DENIED'}`,
      ].join('')
      const downgraded = runRunner([
        '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'read-only', '--write-sid', writeSid,
        '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', downgradeProbe,
      ])
      expect(downgraded.status, `stderr: ${downgraded.stderr}`).toBe(0)
      expect(downgraded.stdout).toContain('DOWNGRADE-WRITE: DENIED')
      expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'downgraded.txt'))).toBe(false)

      const reupgradeProbe = [
        "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
        `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\reupgraded.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'REUPGRADE-WRITE: OK'}catch{'REUPGRADE-WRITE: DENIED'}`,
      ].join('')
      const reupgraded = runRunner([
        '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write', '--write-sid', writeSid,
        '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', reupgradeProbe,
      ])
      expect(reupgraded.status, `stderr: ${reupgraded.stderr}`).toBe(0)
      expect(reupgraded.stdout).toContain('REUPGRADE-WRITE: OK')
      expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'reupgraded.txt'))).toBe(true)
    } finally {
      grant.dispose()
    }
  }, 30_000)

  it('ambient-writable escape regression: a C:\\Users\\Public subdirectory is denied under BOTH modes (INTERACTIVE absent from both lists)', (ctx) => {
    // The Public tree grants write to INTERACTIVE; the D1-D6 matrix pinned
    // that removing INTERACTIVE from the restricting lists closes the escape.
    // The committed suites never probed it — this pins the ambient boundary
    // end to end with the real restricted token.
    if (publicProbeDir === undefined) {
      ctx.skip() // Public unavailable/unwritable on this host
      return
    }
    const probe = [
      "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
      `try{Set-Content -Path '${publicProbeDir}\\public-escaped.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'PUBLIC-WRITE: OK (ESCAPE!)'}catch{'PUBLIC-WRITE: DENIED'}`,
    ].join('')
    for (const mode of ['read-only', 'workspace-write'] as const) {
      const result = runRunner([
        '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', mode,
        '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
      ])
      expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
      expect(result.stdout, `mode: ${mode}`).toContain('PUBLIC-WRITE: DENIED')
      expect(existsSync(join(publicProbeDir, 'public-escaped.txt')), `mode: ${mode}`).toBe(false)
    }
  }, 30_000)

  it('runner-side failure: signature on stderr and exit 127, the command never runs', () => {
    const result = runRunner(['--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write'])
    expect(result.status).toBe(127)
    expect(result.stderr).toContain('windows-acl-run: ')
  }, 15_000)
})