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/ * *
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* Model - facing full - file write . It obtains an optional intent from the single policy slot , calls
* ` ctx.fs.writeText ` without a stat , then records the resulting version ; no policy means an
* unconditional atomic create - or - overwrite .
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* @module @deepseek - ai / dsh - tool - fs / src / write
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* /
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
import { defineTool } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
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import type { DiffCallView , DiffResultView , ToolResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
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import type { ContentBlock } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import type { FsWriteOutcome } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
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import type { } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
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import type { } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
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import { computeHunkDiffs , diffsFromMeta , type FsDiffMeta } from './diff.ts'
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import { sessionResolveOptions } from './session-cwd.ts'
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
import type { FsSandboxSurface } from './sandbox.ts'
2026-06-22 10:48:41 +08:00
Gate JSDoc completeness on every package export
New doc-sync gate verify-export-jsdoc walks every module-level exported
name under packages/*/*/src and requires description prose everywhere,
plus @param per parameter and @returns on non-void annotated returns for
function-like exports, public class methods, properties, and accessors.
The parsing + check helpers move out of gen-cordis-catalog.ts into a
shared scripts/jsdoc.ts so 'documented' means one thing on both gated
surfaces.
Deliberate exemptions (documented in the RFC): heritage-declared class
members (the seam declaration is the doc's one home — the one checker
query in an otherwise pure-AST walk), cordis plugin-protocol slots
(name/inject/reusable/Config/apply, top-level and static), constructors,
overload implementations, declare-module augmentation bodies, and
re-export statements (checked at the defining module).
The 203 under-documented exports the gate found at adoption are filled
in this change, so the gate lands green; generated catalogs/graphs are
regenerated for the shifted line pointers.
RFC: docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-06-export-surface-jsdoc-gate.md
2026-07-06 22:09:30 +08:00
/ * *
* Validate value constraints the schema DSL can ' t express : only a non - blank
* ` file_path ` — an empty ` content ` is legitimate ( it writes an empty file ) .
* @param args - the schema - validated raw tool arguments .
* @returns the camelCased input ; ` content ` passes through untouched .
* /
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export function parseWriteArgs ( args : { file_path : string ; content : string } ) : { filePath : string ; content : string } {
if ( args . file_path . trim ( ) . length === 0 ) throw new Error ( 'file_path must be a non-empty string' )
return { filePath : args.file_path , content : args.content }
}
Gate JSDoc completeness on every package export
New doc-sync gate verify-export-jsdoc walks every module-level exported
name under packages/*/*/src and requires description prose everywhere,
plus @param per parameter and @returns on non-void annotated returns for
function-like exports, public class methods, properties, and accessors.
The parsing + check helpers move out of gen-cordis-catalog.ts into a
shared scripts/jsdoc.ts so 'documented' means one thing on both gated
surfaces.
Deliberate exemptions (documented in the RFC): heritage-declared class
members (the seam declaration is the doc's one home — the one checker
query in an otherwise pure-AST walk), cordis plugin-protocol slots
(name/inject/reusable/Config/apply, top-level and static), constructors,
overload implementations, declare-module augmentation bodies, and
re-export statements (checked at the defining module).
The 203 under-documented exports the gate found at adoption are filled
in this change, so the gate lands green; generated catalogs/graphs are
regenerated for the shifted line pointers.
RFC: docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-06-export-surface-jsdoc-gate.md
2026-07-06 22:09:30 +08:00
/ * *
* Format a write outcome as one model - facing text block body .
* @param displayPath - the backend - resolved path rendered in the envelope ' s ` <path> ` element .
* @param outcome - the write outcome ; its ` operation ` selects the Created / Updated wording .
* @returns the model - facing confirmation envelope ( no file content is echoed back ) .
* /
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export function formatWriteOutput ( displayPath : string , outcome : FsWriteOutcome ) : string {
const verb = outcome . operation === 'create' ? 'Created' : 'Updated'
return ` <path> ${ displayPath } </path>
< type > file < / type >
< content >
$ { verb } file
< / content > `
}
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
/ * *
* The ` write ` tool ' s validated argument shape : the base parameters plus the
* two escalation fields , advertised only under a confining ` ctx.fs ` ( absent
* from the schema otherwise , so the validator rejects them before ` execute ` ) .
* /
interface WriteToolArgs {
file_path : string
content : string
sandbox_permissions? : string
justification? : string
}
Gate JSDoc completeness on every package export
New doc-sync gate verify-export-jsdoc walks every module-level exported
name under packages/*/*/src and requires description prose everywhere,
plus @param per parameter and @returns on non-void annotated returns for
function-like exports, public class methods, properties, and accessors.
The parsing + check helpers move out of gen-cordis-catalog.ts into a
shared scripts/jsdoc.ts so 'documented' means one thing on both gated
surfaces.
Deliberate exemptions (documented in the RFC): heritage-declared class
members (the seam declaration is the doc's one home — the one checker
query in an otherwise pure-AST walk), cordis plugin-protocol slots
(name/inject/reusable/Config/apply, top-level and static), constructors,
overload implementations, declare-module augmentation bodies, and
re-export statements (checked at the defining module).
The 203 under-documented exports the gate found at adoption are filled
in this change, so the gate lands green; generated catalogs/graphs are
regenerated for the shifted line pointers.
RFC: docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-06-export-surface-jsdoc-gate.md
2026-07-06 22:09:30 +08:00
/ * *
* Register the ` write ` tool and its system - prompt guidance .
* @param ctx - the plugin context ; registrations are effects scoped to it , and execution uses its ` fs ` service .
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
* @param sandbox - the shared sandbox - escalation surface ( advertisement , mode stamping , denial mapping ) .
Gate JSDoc completeness on every package export
New doc-sync gate verify-export-jsdoc walks every module-level exported
name under packages/*/*/src and requires description prose everywhere,
plus @param per parameter and @returns on non-void annotated returns for
function-like exports, public class methods, properties, and accessors.
The parsing + check helpers move out of gen-cordis-catalog.ts into a
shared scripts/jsdoc.ts so 'documented' means one thing on both gated
surfaces.
Deliberate exemptions (documented in the RFC): heritage-declared class
members (the seam declaration is the doc's one home — the one checker
query in an otherwise pure-AST walk), cordis plugin-protocol slots
(name/inject/reusable/Config/apply, top-level and static), constructors,
overload implementations, declare-module augmentation bodies, and
re-export statements (checked at the defining module).
The 203 under-documented exports the gate found at adoption are filled
in this change, so the gate lands green; generated catalogs/graphs are
regenerated for the shifted line pointers.
RFC: docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-06-export-surface-jsdoc-gate.md
2026-07-06 22:09:30 +08:00
* /
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
export function applyWriteTool ( ctx : Context , sandbox : FsSandboxSurface ) : void {
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ctx . systemPrompt . section ( {
name : 'tool:write' ,
order : 101 ,
fix(fs): address review — rename to dsh-fs-policy, fs/*-intent events, RFC currency, ENOTDIR
Rename per review naming decisions:
- package dsh-file-context → dsh-fs-policy (dir, package name, plugin name,
tsconfig refs, importers, type-equiv manifest, generated catalog + module-graph)
- events fs/write-expectation → fs/write-intent, fs/edit-expectation → fs/edit-intent
(fs/observed unchanged); type FsWriteExpectation → FsWriteIntent, "expectation"
wording → "intent" throughout
- exported FileContextExec → FsPolicyExec
Make the implemented RFCs describe what shipped, not the superseded designs:
the 2026-06-17 capability-seam + tool-schemas RFCs no longer place policy on
ctx.fs or use full/partial-view authorization, and the fsspec RFC's ctx.fileContext
service prose is rewritten to the fs/* event-gate reality (freshness-based auth).
Sharpen docs/rfc/implemented/AGENTS.md: a rename is a fact to fix IN PLACE — the
"new RFC" escape hatch is for macro decision reversals only, not renames.
Code fixes from review:
- fsio.ts resolveLocalTarget/probe translate ENOTDIR (a parent path segment is a
file) into the structured FsError taxonomy instead of leaking a raw Node error;
resolve reports FS_NOT_FOUND, probe reports absent. Regression tests proven to
fail on the unfixed code.
- tool-fs HMR test now asserts prompt sections (not just tool schemas) are
withdrawn on disposal.
- fs/observed is a plain (unguarded) ctx.emit: correct the fs-policy comment,
filesystem.md, and tool-fs module doc that wrongly claimed the tool "contains"
a throwing listener; a throw surfaces as the tool's isError result.
- drop the false "loaded by the default product config" claim (no config wires
the fs tools yet), the duplicate ctx.bash service-map row, the stale
FileReadRequest catalog link-map entry, and the fs/fs README EOF blank line;
correct the dsh-fs package.json description.
2026-07-02 03:12:38 +08:00
text : 'Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.' ,
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} )
ctx . tools . register ( defineTool ( {
name : 'write' ,
description : 'Create or fully replace a UTF-8 text file.' ,
parameters : {
file_path : { type : 'string' , required : true , description : 'Path to write, resolved by the filesystem backend.' } ,
content : { type : 'string' , required : true , description : 'Full UTF-8 text content to write.' } ,
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
. . . sandbox . escalationModes . length > 0 ? sandbox . schemaFields ( ) : { } ,
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} ,
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
async execute ( args : WriteToolArgs , exec ) : Promise < { content : ContentBlock [ ] ; meta? : FsDiffMeta } > {
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const input = parseWriteArgs ( args )
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
// Resolve the per-call sandbox mode (escalation grant > session override
// > backend default) BEFORE anything executes; an escalating call
// resolves approval here and throws its distinct text on any non-grant.
const sandboxMode = await sandbox . stampMode ( 'write' , args , exec )
2026-07-14 19:50:25 +08:00
const target = await ctx . fs . resolve ( input . filePath , sessionResolveOptions ( exec ) )
2026-06-28 13:49:02 +08:00
// Single-slot decision: the policy plugin produces createIfAbsent/
// replaceIfVersion; the bare default is undefined (unconditional). No stat.
fix(fs): address review — rename to dsh-fs-policy, fs/*-intent events, RFC currency, ENOTDIR
Rename per review naming decisions:
- package dsh-file-context → dsh-fs-policy (dir, package name, plugin name,
tsconfig refs, importers, type-equiv manifest, generated catalog + module-graph)
- events fs/write-expectation → fs/write-intent, fs/edit-expectation → fs/edit-intent
(fs/observed unchanged); type FsWriteExpectation → FsWriteIntent, "expectation"
wording → "intent" throughout
- exported FileContextExec → FsPolicyExec
Make the implemented RFCs describe what shipped, not the superseded designs:
the 2026-06-17 capability-seam + tool-schemas RFCs no longer place policy on
ctx.fs or use full/partial-view authorization, and the fsspec RFC's ctx.fileContext
service prose is rewritten to the fs/* event-gate reality (freshness-based auth).
Sharpen docs/rfc/implemented/AGENTS.md: a rename is a fact to fix IN PLACE — the
"new RFC" escape hatch is for macro decision reversals only, not renames.
Code fixes from review:
- fsio.ts resolveLocalTarget/probe translate ENOTDIR (a parent path segment is a
file) into the structured FsError taxonomy instead of leaking a raw Node error;
resolve reports FS_NOT_FOUND, probe reports absent. Regression tests proven to
fail on the unfixed code.
- tool-fs HMR test now asserts prompt sections (not just tool schemas) are
withdrawn on disposal.
- fs/observed is a plain (unguarded) ctx.emit: correct the fs-policy comment,
filesystem.md, and tool-fs module doc that wrongly claimed the tool "contains"
a throwing listener; a throw surfaces as the tool's isError result.
- drop the false "loaded by the default product config" claim (no config wires
the fs tools yet), the duplicate ctx.bash service-map row, the stale
FileReadRequest catalog link-map entry, and the fs/fs README EOF blank line;
correct the dsh-fs package.json description.
2026-07-02 03:12:38 +08:00
const intent = await ctx . waterfall ( 'fs/write-intent' , target , exec , ( ) = > undefined )
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
let outcome : FsWriteOutcome
try {
outcome = await ctx . fs . writeText ( target , input . content , intent , exec . signal , sandboxMode )
} catch ( error : unknown ) {
// A sandbox denial becomes the shared [sandbox: …] marker (the model
// recognizes it from bash); any other error passes through.
throw sandbox . mapError ( error , sandboxMode )
}
2026-06-29 10:34:08 +08:00
// Record the observed version (a no-op when no policy plugin listens).
ctx . emit ( 'fs/observed' , target , outcome . version , exec )
2026-07-13 23:27:00 +08:00
// Overwrites carry applied hunks. Creates have no prior text, so result presentation uses
// the args-derived whole-file diff instead.
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const diffs = outcome . before !== null ? computeHunkDiffs ( input . filePath , outcome . before , outcome . after ) : [ ]
return {
content : [ { type : 'text' , text : formatWriteOutput ( target . displayPath , outcome ) } ] ,
. . . diffs . length > 0 ? { meta : { diffs } } : { } ,
}
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} ,
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// Pure display: a diff card (an editor renders write as a new-file / full- replace diff).
// `oldText: null` — a call-time presenter has no access to the file's prior content, so
// even an overwrite renders new-file style, matching claude-agent-acp.
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presentCall ( args ) : DiffCallView {
return {
card : 'diff' ,
title : ` Write ${ args . file_path } ` ,
diffs : [ { path : args.file_path , oldText : null , newText : args.content } ] ,
locations : [ { path : args.file_path } ] ,
}
feat(tool-fs): editor-facing presentation for read/write/edit
The fs tools rendered as generic cards (title = tool name, raw file content) in
an ACP editor. Give them tool-owned presentation like bash/subagent have:
- read → title "Read <path>", kind read, offset/limit as rawInput
- write → title "Write <path>", kind edit
- edit → title "Edit <path>", kind edit, a clipped old→new rawInput summary
Add a provider-neutral `locations: { path, line? }[]` to ToolCallPresentation —
the files a call reads/modifies — so a capable editor can follow along / jump to
the file (read carries its offset as the line). The ACP bridge forwards it onto
the wire `tool_call` (ResolvedCallPresentation + call() + the tool_call build in
streamSessionEventUpdate). This flips the `locations` cell in the ACP feature
matrix to supported. The SDK already carries `tool_call.locations`
(ToolCallLocation `{ path, line? }`), so no ACP types leak into dsh-tools.
presentResult is intentionally omitted: it only receives `{ content, isError }`,
not the write/edit outcome, so titling by create-vs-overwrite or replacement
count would mean parsing the model-facing text — the static title stays.
Tests: pure presentCall assertions for all three tools incl. locations and the
edit rawInput clip; a bridge test drives the REAL fs tools through ToolPresenter
and asserts locations reaches the wire tool_call (proven to fail without the
forwarding line). New withFs harness option + dsh-fs devDeps on dsh-acp.
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} ,
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// Result-time display: a `diff` card so the completed `tool_call_update` re-installs the
// diff rather than the model-facing result text (an ACP `tool_call_update.content` REPLACES
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// the call's content, so a text result would clobber the pending diff card). Overwrites use
// applied metadata; creates and identical overwrites use the replay-safe args fallback.
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presentResult ( args , result : ToolResult ) : DiffResultView | undefined {
if ( result . isError ) return undefined
const diffs = diffsFromMeta ( result . meta )
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? ? [ { path : args.file_path , oldText : null , newText : args.content } ]
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return { card : 'diff' , title : ` Write ${ args . file_path } ` , diffs }
} ,
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} ) )
}