deepseek-harness/packages/fs/tool-fs/src/write.ts

128 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Normal View History

/**
* Model-facing full-file write. It obtains an optional intent from the single policy slot, calls
* `ctx.fs.writeText` without a stat, then records the resulting version; no policy means an
* unconditional atomic create-or-overwrite.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs/src/write
*/
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
import { defineTool } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
import type { DiffCallView, DiffResultView, ToolResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
import type { ContentBlock } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import type { FsWriteOutcome } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
import { computeHunkDiffs, diffsFromMeta, type FsDiffMeta } from './diff.ts'
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/project-instruction-files # Conflicts: # AGENTS.md # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/core.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-07-05-reconstructable-requests.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-15-code-mode.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-hook-bridges.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md # docs/rfc/proposed/simplification/2026-07-04-prune-dead-core-spine-surface.md # examples/AGENTS.md # examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts # examples/echo-agent/cordis.yml # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/cordis.yml # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/core/agent-core/README.md # packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/README.md # packages/core/agent-loop/src/loop.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts # packages/core/agent/src/types.ts # packages/core/tools/README.md # packages/core/tools/src/code-mode.ts # packages/core/tools/src/index.ts # packages/fs/fs-local/src/index.ts # packages/fs/fs/README.md # packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts # packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/README.md # packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/src/index.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-claude/src/index.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-codex/src/index.ts # packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts
2026-07-14 19:50:25 +08:00
import { sessionResolveOptions } from './session-cwd.ts'
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
import type { FsSandboxSurface } from './sandbox.ts'
/**
* Validate value constraints the schema DSL can't express: only a non-blank
* `file_path` — an empty `content` is legitimate (it writes an empty file).
* @param args - the schema-validated raw tool arguments.
* @returns the camelCased input; `content` passes through untouched.
*/
export function parseWriteArgs(args: { file_path: string; content: string }): { filePath: string; content: string } {
if (args.file_path.trim().length === 0) throw new Error('file_path must be a non-empty string')
return { filePath: args.file_path, content: args.content }
}
/**
* Format a write outcome as one model-facing text block body.
* @param displayPath - the backend-resolved path rendered in the envelope's `<path>` element.
* @param outcome - the write outcome; its `operation` selects the Created/Updated wording.
* @returns the model-facing confirmation envelope (no file content is echoed back).
*/
export function formatWriteOutput(displayPath: string, outcome: FsWriteOutcome): string {
const verb = outcome.operation === 'create' ? 'Created' : 'Updated'
return `<path>${displayPath}</path>
<type>file</type>
<content>
${verb} file
</content>`
}
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
/**
* The `write` tool's validated argument shape: the base parameters plus the
* two escalation fields, advertised only under a confining `ctx.fs` (absent
* from the schema otherwise, so the validator rejects them before `execute`).
*/
interface WriteToolArgs {
file_path: string
content: string
sandbox_permissions?: string
justification?: string
}
/**
* Register the `write` tool and its system-prompt guidance.
* @param ctx - the plugin context; registrations are effects scoped to it, and execution uses its `fs` service.
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
* @param sandbox - the shared sandbox-escalation surface (advertisement, mode stamping, denial mapping).
*/
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
export function applyWriteTool(ctx: Context, sandbox: FsSandboxSurface): void {
ctx.systemPrompt.section({
name: 'tool:write',
order: 101,
fix(fs): address review — rename to dsh-fs-policy, fs/*-intent events, RFC currency, ENOTDIR Rename per review naming decisions: - package dsh-file-context → dsh-fs-policy (dir, package name, plugin name, tsconfig refs, importers, type-equiv manifest, generated catalog + module-graph) - events fs/write-expectation → fs/write-intent, fs/edit-expectation → fs/edit-intent (fs/observed unchanged); type FsWriteExpectation → FsWriteIntent, "expectation" wording → "intent" throughout - exported FileContextExec → FsPolicyExec Make the implemented RFCs describe what shipped, not the superseded designs: the 2026-06-17 capability-seam + tool-schemas RFCs no longer place policy on ctx.fs or use full/partial-view authorization, and the fsspec RFC's ctx.fileContext service prose is rewritten to the fs/* event-gate reality (freshness-based auth). Sharpen docs/rfc/implemented/AGENTS.md: a rename is a fact to fix IN PLACE — the "new RFC" escape hatch is for macro decision reversals only, not renames. Code fixes from review: - fsio.ts resolveLocalTarget/probe translate ENOTDIR (a parent path segment is a file) into the structured FsError taxonomy instead of leaking a raw Node error; resolve reports FS_NOT_FOUND, probe reports absent. Regression tests proven to fail on the unfixed code. - tool-fs HMR test now asserts prompt sections (not just tool schemas) are withdrawn on disposal. - fs/observed is a plain (unguarded) ctx.emit: correct the fs-policy comment, filesystem.md, and tool-fs module doc that wrongly claimed the tool "contains" a throwing listener; a throw surfaces as the tool's isError result. - drop the false "loaded by the default product config" claim (no config wires the fs tools yet), the duplicate ctx.bash service-map row, the stale FileReadRequest catalog link-map entry, and the fs/fs README EOF blank line; correct the dsh-fs package.json description.
2026-07-02 03:12:38 +08:00
text: 'Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.',
})
ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
name: 'write',
description: 'Create or fully replace a UTF-8 text file.',
parameters: {
file_path: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Path to write, resolved by the filesystem backend.' },
content: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Full UTF-8 text content to write.' },
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
...sandbox.escalationModes.length > 0 ? sandbox.schemaFields() : {},
},
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
async execute(args: WriteToolArgs, exec): Promise<{ content: ContentBlock[]; meta?: FsDiffMeta }> {
const input = parseWriteArgs(args)
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
// Resolve the per-call sandbox mode (escalation grant > session override
// > backend default) BEFORE anything executes; an escalating call
// resolves approval here and throws its distinct text on any non-grant.
const sandboxMode = await sandbox.stampMode('write', args, exec)
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/project-instruction-files # Conflicts: # AGENTS.md # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/core.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-07-05-reconstructable-requests.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-15-code-mode.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-hook-bridges.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md # docs/rfc/proposed/simplification/2026-07-04-prune-dead-core-spine-surface.md # examples/AGENTS.md # examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts # examples/echo-agent/cordis.yml # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/cordis.yml # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/core/agent-core/README.md # packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/README.md # packages/core/agent-loop/src/loop.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts # packages/core/agent/src/types.ts # packages/core/tools/README.md # packages/core/tools/src/code-mode.ts # packages/core/tools/src/index.ts # packages/fs/fs-local/src/index.ts # packages/fs/fs/README.md # packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts # packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/README.md # packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/src/index.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-claude/src/index.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-codex/src/index.ts # packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts
2026-07-14 19:50:25 +08:00
const target = await ctx.fs.resolve(input.filePath, sessionResolveOptions(exec))
// Single-slot decision: the policy plugin produces createIfAbsent/
// replaceIfVersion; the bare default is undefined (unconditional). No stat.
fix(fs): address review — rename to dsh-fs-policy, fs/*-intent events, RFC currency, ENOTDIR Rename per review naming decisions: - package dsh-file-context → dsh-fs-policy (dir, package name, plugin name, tsconfig refs, importers, type-equiv manifest, generated catalog + module-graph) - events fs/write-expectation → fs/write-intent, fs/edit-expectation → fs/edit-intent (fs/observed unchanged); type FsWriteExpectation → FsWriteIntent, "expectation" wording → "intent" throughout - exported FileContextExec → FsPolicyExec Make the implemented RFCs describe what shipped, not the superseded designs: the 2026-06-17 capability-seam + tool-schemas RFCs no longer place policy on ctx.fs or use full/partial-view authorization, and the fsspec RFC's ctx.fileContext service prose is rewritten to the fs/* event-gate reality (freshness-based auth). Sharpen docs/rfc/implemented/AGENTS.md: a rename is a fact to fix IN PLACE — the "new RFC" escape hatch is for macro decision reversals only, not renames. Code fixes from review: - fsio.ts resolveLocalTarget/probe translate ENOTDIR (a parent path segment is a file) into the structured FsError taxonomy instead of leaking a raw Node error; resolve reports FS_NOT_FOUND, probe reports absent. Regression tests proven to fail on the unfixed code. - tool-fs HMR test now asserts prompt sections (not just tool schemas) are withdrawn on disposal. - fs/observed is a plain (unguarded) ctx.emit: correct the fs-policy comment, filesystem.md, and tool-fs module doc that wrongly claimed the tool "contains" a throwing listener; a throw surfaces as the tool's isError result. - drop the false "loaded by the default product config" claim (no config wires the fs tools yet), the duplicate ctx.bash service-map row, the stale FileReadRequest catalog link-map entry, and the fs/fs README EOF blank line; correct the dsh-fs package.json description.
2026-07-02 03:12:38 +08:00
const intent = await ctx.waterfall('fs/write-intent', target, exec, () => undefined)
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
let outcome: FsWriteOutcome
try {
outcome = await ctx.fs.writeText(target, input.content, intent, exec.signal, sandboxMode)
} catch (error: unknown) {
// A sandbox denial becomes the shared [sandbox: …] marker (the model
// recognizes it from bash); any other error passes through.
throw sandbox.mapError(error, sandboxMode)
}
// Record the observed version (a no-op when no policy plugin listens).
ctx.emit('fs/observed', target, outcome.version, exec)
// Overwrites carry applied hunks. Creates have no prior text, so result presentation uses
// the args-derived whole-file diff instead.
const diffs = outcome.before !== null ? computeHunkDiffs(input.filePath, outcome.before, outcome.after) : []
return {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: formatWriteOutput(target.displayPath, outcome) }],
...diffs.length > 0 ? { meta: { diffs } } : {},
}
},
2026-07-12 03:36:43 +08:00
// Pure display: a diff card (an editor renders write as a new-file / full- replace diff).
// `oldText: null` — a call-time presenter has no access to the file's prior content, so
// even an overwrite renders new-file style, matching claude-agent-acp.
presentCall(args): DiffCallView {
return {
card: 'diff',
title: `Write ${args.file_path}`,
diffs: [{ path: args.file_path, oldText: null, newText: args.content }],
locations: [{ path: args.file_path }],
}
2026-07-02 19:36:17 +08:00
},
2026-07-12 03:36:43 +08:00
// Result-time display: a `diff` card so the completed `tool_call_update` re-installs the
// diff rather than the model-facing result text (an ACP `tool_call_update.content` REPLACES
// the call's content, so a text result would clobber the pending diff card). Overwrites use
// applied metadata; creates and identical overwrites use the replay-safe args fallback.
presentResult(args, result: ToolResult): DiffResultView | undefined {
if (result.isError) return undefined
const diffs = diffsFromMeta(result.meta)
?? [{ path: args.file_path, oldText: null, newText: args.content }]
return { card: 'diff', title: `Write ${args.file_path}`, diffs }
},
}))
}