deepseek-harness/packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts

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import { mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import { CallId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import { BashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
import type { BashExecRequest, BashExecSpec, BashProcess, BashProcessRead, BashRunResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
import SystemPrompt from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
import ToolRegistry from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
import AgentRegistry from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
Merge branch 'codex/simp-agent-entry-state' into codex/simp-unify-agent-session-id # Conflicts: # docs/architecture.md # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/core.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/module-graph.md # examples/coding-agent/tests/code-mode.e2e.ts # examples/coding-agent/tests/coding-task.e2e.ts # examples/coding-agent/tests/compaction.e2e.ts # examples/coding-agent/tests/full-loop.e2e.ts # examples/coding-agent/tests/todo-write.e2e.ts # examples/cordis-agent/tests/cordis-tools.e2e.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/integration.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/compact/compact-basic/tests/compact-loop-repro.spec.ts # packages/context/time-context/tests/time-context.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/tests/integration.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/README.md # packages/core/agent-loop/src/agent.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/src/index.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/agent.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/cancel.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/config-session-id.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/contract-regressions.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/coverage-edges.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/loop.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/properties.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/request-cache.e2e.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/request-reconstruction.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/resume.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/scope-lifecycle.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/tool-order.spec.ts # packages/core/agent-loop/tests/turn-stop.spec.ts # packages/core/agent/src/types.ts # packages/examples/agent-spine-demo/README.md # packages/examples/agent-spine-demo/tests/agent-core.spec.ts # packages/examples/stdio-demo/README.md # packages/examples/stdio-demo/src/index.ts # packages/examples/stdio-demo/tests/stdio-agent.spec.ts # packages/fs/tool-fs/tests/fs-tools.e2e.ts # packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/tests/repeat-tool-guard.spec.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-claude/tests/bridge.spec.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-claude/tests/coverage.spec.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-codex/tests/bridge.spec.ts # packages/hooks/hooks-codex/tests/coverage.spec.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-fork/tests/multi-subagent.spec.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-fork/tests/subagent-fork.spec.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess/tests/structured.spec.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess/tests/subagent-inprocess.spec.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-spawn/tests/spawn.e2e.ts # packages/subagent/subagent-spawn/tests/subagent-spawn.spec.ts # packages/todo/tool-todo/tests/integration.spec.ts # packages/ui/acp/tests/dispose.spec.ts # packages/ui/acp/tests/edges.spec.ts # packages/workflow/workflow-workerthread/tests/integration.spec.ts
2026-07-18 12:21:15 +08:00
import SessionStore, { SessionId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
import SessionPersistenceJsonl from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence-jsonl'
import TaskService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks'
import * as ToolTasks from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks'
import ApprovalService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
import type { ApprovalOutcome } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
import { LocalBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
import * as ToolBash from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash'
import { processOutcome } from '../src/background.ts'
import { renderProcessRead, renderResult } from '../src/render.ts'
const spillDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-tool-bash-spec-'))
/** Foreground-only harness: no task runtime (backgrounding fails loud here). */
async function setup() {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
Expose audited hardcoded tunables as plugin config The audit swept every packages/*/* plugin for the new AGENTS.md convention (no hardcoded tunables in plugins) and exposes each finding as a defaulted, validated Config field. Defaults are the previously hardcoded values throughout, so no deployment or golden changes. - tool-fs (had NO Config): readLimit, readMaxLineLength, readMaxBytes, readStreamMinSize. The caps thread through ReadToolCaps/ReadWindow — read-render already documented that the consumer applies the caps, so they become explicit per-request fields. - tool-web: searchMaxResults (WEB_SEARCH_MAX_RESULTS stays as the schemastery default). Also fixes the stale GREP_LIMIT references in search.ts and the web-capability-seam RFC (no such constant exists). - bash-local: graceMs (SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation grace). The RunInternals.graceMs test seam is gone: graceMs is now a required SpawnSpec field filled from config, so tests exercise the real config path and the defaults live in exactly one place. - subagent-acp: disposeEofGraceMs / disposeGraceMs. The AcpRunSpec fields become required for the same one-defaulting-layer reason. - session-persistence-sqlite: journalMode ('wal' default; the rollback-journal modes serve filesystems where WAL's shared-memory files do not work, e.g. network mounts). - hooks-claude + hooks-codex: stderrSummaryMaxChars for the persisted hook/result stderr summary. The duplicated summarize() helpers merge into hook-protocol's summarizeStderr(stderr, maxChars), beside the HookResultRecord field it feeds, with the bound parameterized the same way runHook's defaultTimeoutMs already is. - compact-basic: charsPerToken for the token estimator (default 4, the English-text heuristic; CJK-heavy deployments need ~1-2 or compaction fires far too late). Also corrects the BasicCompactService class doc, which claimed defaults the required-field config never had. - fs-local: deletes the dead STREAM_MIN_SIZE constant and the dead FsIoInternals.streamMinSize seam — the read-routing bound lives in the consumer (tool-fs), where it is now config. This is item 1 of the proposed prune-write-only-fs-surface RFC, annotated accordingly. Every new field gets range validation (following the existing assertPositiveFinite pattern), a README row, and tests covering the configured behavior, the schema default, and load-time rejection.
2026-07-04 17:37:23 +08:00
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, { timeoutMs: 10_000, graceMs: 200 })
;(ctx.bash as LocalBashExecutor).internals = { spillDir }
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
return ctx
}
/** Full harness: the generic task runtime + its control surface, then the bash tool. */
async function setupWithTasks() {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
await ctx.plugin(ToolTasks)
Expose audited hardcoded tunables as plugin config The audit swept every packages/*/* plugin for the new AGENTS.md convention (no hardcoded tunables in plugins) and exposes each finding as a defaulted, validated Config field. Defaults are the previously hardcoded values throughout, so no deployment or golden changes. - tool-fs (had NO Config): readLimit, readMaxLineLength, readMaxBytes, readStreamMinSize. The caps thread through ReadToolCaps/ReadWindow — read-render already documented that the consumer applies the caps, so they become explicit per-request fields. - tool-web: searchMaxResults (WEB_SEARCH_MAX_RESULTS stays as the schemastery default). Also fixes the stale GREP_LIMIT references in search.ts and the web-capability-seam RFC (no such constant exists). - bash-local: graceMs (SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation grace). The RunInternals.graceMs test seam is gone: graceMs is now a required SpawnSpec field filled from config, so tests exercise the real config path and the defaults live in exactly one place. - subagent-acp: disposeEofGraceMs / disposeGraceMs. The AcpRunSpec fields become required for the same one-defaulting-layer reason. - session-persistence-sqlite: journalMode ('wal' default; the rollback-journal modes serve filesystems where WAL's shared-memory files do not work, e.g. network mounts). - hooks-claude + hooks-codex: stderrSummaryMaxChars for the persisted hook/result stderr summary. The duplicated summarize() helpers merge into hook-protocol's summarizeStderr(stderr, maxChars), beside the HookResultRecord field it feeds, with the bound parameterized the same way runHook's defaultTimeoutMs already is. - compact-basic: charsPerToken for the token estimator (default 4, the English-text heuristic; CJK-heavy deployments need ~1-2 or compaction fires far too late). Also corrects the BasicCompactService class doc, which claimed defaults the required-field config never had. - fs-local: deletes the dead STREAM_MIN_SIZE constant and the dead FsIoInternals.streamMinSize seam — the read-routing bound lives in the consumer (tool-fs), where it is now config. This is item 1 of the proposed prune-write-only-fs-surface RFC, annotated accordingly. Every new field gets range validation (following the existing assertPositiveFinite pattern), a README row, and tests covering the configured behavior, the schema default, and load-time rejection.
2026-07-04 17:37:23 +08:00
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, { timeoutMs: 10_000, graceMs: 200 })
;(ctx.bash as LocalBashExecutor).internals = { spillDir }
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
return ctx
}
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
/**
* Build a fake {@link Agent} with the shared agent/session identity, give it a
* dedicated lifecycle fiber for `Agent.ctx`, and register it in `ctx.agents`.
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
*/
function registerFakeAgent(ctx: Context, sessionId: string, inject: (...args: unknown[]) => void = () => {}): Agent {
const scopeFiber = ctx.plugin(() => {})
const id = SessionId(sessionId)
const agent = {
id,
ctx: scopeFiber.ctx,
inject,
session: { id, header: { version: 0, id, createdAt: 0 } },
} as unknown as Agent
ctx.agents.register(agent)
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
return agent
}
let callCounter = 0
function call(ctx: Context, name: string, args: unknown, agent?: Agent) {
return ctx.tools.execute({ callId: CallId(`call-${++callCounter}`), name, arguments: args, ...agent ? { agent } : {} })
}
function text(result: { content: { type: string; text?: string }[] }): string {
return result.content.filter(block => block.type === 'text').map(block => block.text).join('')
}
async function callUntilText(
ctx: Context,
name: string,
args: unknown,
expected: string,
timeoutMs = 5_000,
): Promise<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof call>>> {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs
let last: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof call>> | undefined
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
last = await call(ctx, name, args)
if (text(last).includes(expected)) return last
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20))
}
throw new Error(`${name} output did not include ${JSON.stringify(expected)}; last text was ${JSON.stringify(last !== undefined ? text(last) : '')}`)
}
class RecordingSandboxExecutor extends BashExecutor {
readonly modes: Array<string | undefined> = []
override get sandboxMode() {
return 'read-only' as const
}
resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 1000,
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode ?? 'read-only',
}
}
run(spec: BashExecSpec): Promise<BashRunResult> {
this.modes.push(spec.sandboxMode)
return Promise.resolve({
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
timedOut: false,
aborted: false,
timeoutMs: spec.timeoutMs,
stdout: { text: 'ok', truncated: false },
stderr: { text: '', truncated: false },
sandbox: { mode: spec.sandboxMode ?? 'read-only', denied: false },
})
}
start(spec: BashExecSpec): BashProcess {
this.modes.push(spec.sandboxMode)
return {
status: 'completed',
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
done: Promise.resolve(),
sandbox: { mode: spec.sandboxMode ?? 'read-only', denied: false },
readOutput: () => ({ delta: '', lossy: false }),
kill: () => false,
}
}
}
/** Test executor that records whether the background start boundary was crossed. */
class CountingStartExecutor extends BashExecutor {
starts = 0
resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? '/x',
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
}
}
run(): Promise<BashRunResult> { return Promise.reject(new Error('unused')) }
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
start(): BashProcess {
this.starts += 1
return {
status: 'completed',
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
done: Promise.resolve(),
readOutput: () => ({ delta: '', lossy: false }),
kill: () => false,
}
}
}
async function setupSandboxed(withApproval = false) {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
await ctx.plugin(ToolTasks)
await ctx.plugin(RecordingSandboxExecutor)
if (withApproval) await ctx.plugin(ApprovalService)
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
return { ctx, bash: ctx.bash as RecordingSandboxExecutor }
}
function sandboxAgent(mode?: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access', ctx?: Context): Agent {
const events: Array<{ type: string; data?: Record<string, unknown> }> = [{ type: 'turn/start' }]
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox # Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.golden.json # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/bwrap.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/sandbox.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/seatbelt.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/render.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tsconfig.json # pnpm-lock.yaml # scripts/verify-package-readme-model-experience.ts
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if (mode !== undefined) events.push({ type: 'sandbox/mode', data: { mode } })
const id = SessionId('sandbox-session')
return {
id,
...ctx === undefined ? {} : { ctx: ctx.plugin(() => {}).ctx },
session: {
id,
header: { version: 0, id, createdAt: 0 },
events,
append: (type: string, data: Record<string, unknown>) => {
const event = { type, data }
events.push(event)
return event
},
},
} as unknown as Agent
}
describe('bash tool', () => {
it('returns stdout for a successful command', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo hello', description: 'test command' })
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toBe('hello\n')
})
it('reports (no output) for silent commands', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'true', description: 'test command' })
expect(text(result)).toBe('(no output)')
})
it('marks stderr sections', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo out; echo err >&2', description: 'test command' })
expect(text(result)).toBe('out\n[stderr]\nerr\n')
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
})
it('reports non-zero exits without isError', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo failing; exit 3', description: 'test command' })
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toBe('failing\n[exit code: 3]')
})
it('reports timeout kills with both markers (timeout first)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', timeoutMs: 100 })
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toBe('(no output)\n[timed out after 100ms]\n[killed by signal: SIGTERM]')
})
it('reports a timeout even when the command traps the signal and exits 0', async () => {
// The signal-independent timeout marker: a trapped SIGTERM that exits 0
// after our timer fired must NOT look like a clean success. (bash may
// print "Terminated" to stderr for the killed sleep — environment
// dependent — so assert the marker, not the exact body.)
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'trap "exit 0" TERM; sleep 60', description: 'test command', timeoutMs: 100 })
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toContain('[timed out after 100ms]')
expect(text(result)).not.toContain('[exit code:')
})
it('reports truncation with the spill path', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
Expose audited hardcoded tunables as plugin config The audit swept every packages/*/* plugin for the new AGENTS.md convention (no hardcoded tunables in plugins) and exposes each finding as a defaulted, validated Config field. Defaults are the previously hardcoded values throughout, so no deployment or golden changes. - tool-fs (had NO Config): readLimit, readMaxLineLength, readMaxBytes, readStreamMinSize. The caps thread through ReadToolCaps/ReadWindow — read-render already documented that the consumer applies the caps, so they become explicit per-request fields. - tool-web: searchMaxResults (WEB_SEARCH_MAX_RESULTS stays as the schemastery default). Also fixes the stale GREP_LIMIT references in search.ts and the web-capability-seam RFC (no such constant exists). - bash-local: graceMs (SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation grace). The RunInternals.graceMs test seam is gone: graceMs is now a required SpawnSpec field filled from config, so tests exercise the real config path and the defaults live in exactly one place. - subagent-acp: disposeEofGraceMs / disposeGraceMs. The AcpRunSpec fields become required for the same one-defaulting-layer reason. - session-persistence-sqlite: journalMode ('wal' default; the rollback-journal modes serve filesystems where WAL's shared-memory files do not work, e.g. network mounts). - hooks-claude + hooks-codex: stderrSummaryMaxChars for the persisted hook/result stderr summary. The duplicated summarize() helpers merge into hook-protocol's summarizeStderr(stderr, maxChars), beside the HookResultRecord field it feeds, with the bound parameterized the same way runHook's defaultTimeoutMs already is. - compact-basic: charsPerToken for the token estimator (default 4, the English-text heuristic; CJK-heavy deployments need ~1-2 or compaction fires far too late). Also corrects the BasicCompactService class doc, which claimed defaults the required-field config never had. - fs-local: deletes the dead STREAM_MIN_SIZE constant and the dead FsIoInternals.streamMinSize seam — the read-routing bound lives in the consumer (tool-fs), where it is now config. This is item 1 of the proposed prune-write-only-fs-surface RFC, annotated accordingly. Every new field gets range validation (following the existing assertPositiveFinite pattern), a README row, and tests covering the configured behavior, the schema default, and load-time rejection.
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await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, { maxOutputBytes: 100, graceMs: 200 })
;(ctx.bash as LocalBashExecutor).internals = { spillDir }
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'for i in $(seq 1 100); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', description: 'test command' })
expect(text(result)).toContain('[output truncated; full output: ')
expect(text(result)).toContain('line-0100')
})
it('honors workdir', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'test command', workdir: '/tmp' })
expect(text(result).trim()).toMatch(/\/tmp$/)
})
it('surfaces spawn failures as isError', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'true', description: 'test command', workdir: '/nonexistent-dsh' })
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toMatch(/ENOENT/)
})
it('surfaces foreground aborts as isError', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const controller = new AbortController()
const pending = ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('call-abort'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command' },
signal: controller.signal,
})
setTimeout(() => { controller.abort() }, 50)
const result = await pending
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toMatch(/aborted/)
})
// Type and required-key violations are rejected by the harness
2026-07-19 22:50:49 +08:00
// (defineTool validates against the SchemaSpec — the arg-validation Agent Note) before execute.
it.each([
[{}, /missing required property "command"/],
[{ command: 42, description: 'd' }, /"command" must be a string/],
[{ command: 'x' }, /missing required property "description"/],
[{ command: 'x', description: 7 }, /"description" must be a string/],
[{ command: 'x', description: 'd', timeoutMs: 'soon' }, /"timeoutMs" must be a number/],
[{ command: 'x', description: 'd', workdir: 7 }, /"workdir" must be a string/],
[{ command: 'x', description: 'd', run_in_background: 'yes' }, /"run_in_background" must be a boolean/],
])('rejects schema-invalid args %j', async (args, pattern) => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', args)
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toMatch(pattern)
})
// Value constraints the SchemaSpec can't express stay in the tool body.
it.each([
[{ command: ' ', description: 'd' }, /invalid command/],
[{ command: 'x', description: ' ' }, /invalid description/],
[{ command: 'x', description: 'd', timeoutMs: -1 }, /invalid timeoutMs/],
])('rejects value-invalid args %j', async (args, pattern) => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', args)
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toMatch(pattern)
})
it('rejects a non-JSON numeric argument before tool-specific validation', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', {
command: 'x', description: 'd', timeoutMs: Number.NaN,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('tool execution arguments must be losslessly JSON-serializable')
})
it('registers the bash schema with run_in_background exposed by default', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const schemas = ctx.tools.schemas()
expect(schemas.map(schema => schema.name)).toEqual(['bash'])
const bashSchema = schemas[0]!
expect(bashSchema.parameters).toMatchObject({
type: 'object',
required: ['command', 'description'],
})
expect(Object.keys(bashSchema.parameters.properties as Record<string, unknown>))
.toContain('run_in_background')
expect(bashSchema.description).toContain('task_output')
})
it('contributes the exit-code habit as its prompt section (guidance the descriptions cannot carry)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
ctx.systemPrompt.section({ name: 'test:before-bash', order: 104, text: 'before' })
ctx.systemPrompt.section({ name: 'test:after-bash', order: 106, text: 'after' })
const assembly = await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble()
const section = assembly.sections.find(s => s.name === 'tool:bash')
expect(assembly.sections.map(s => s.name)).toEqual([
'harness:identity',
'deployment:persona',
'test:before-bash',
'tool:bash',
'test:after-bash',
])
expect(section?.text).toContain('[exit code: N]')
})
it('unregisters everything when the plugin fiber is disposed (HMR safety)', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, {})
const fiber = await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
expect(ctx.tools.schemas()).toHaveLength(1)
expect((await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble()).sections.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['harness:identity', 'deployment:persona', 'tool:bash'])
await fiber.dispose()
expect(ctx.tools.schemas()).toHaveLength(0)
// Only the system-prompt plugin's own built-in sections remain.
expect((await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble()).sections.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['harness:identity', 'deployment:persona'])
})
it('tools depend on the executor: no registration without ctx.bash', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
// inject: ['tools', 'bash'] keeps the plugin pending until bash exists.
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
expect(ctx.tools.schemas()).toHaveLength(0)
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, {})
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 0))
expect(ctx.tools.schemas()).toHaveLength(1)
})
it('applies the built-in background default when apply() receives a bare config', async () => {
// Bypasses the schemastery defaults on purpose: apply() must stand on its
// own `?? true` fallback when embedded programmatically without the schema.
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, {})
ToolBash.apply(ctx, {})
const schema = ctx.tools.schemas()[0]!
expect(Object.keys(schema.parameters.properties as Record<string, unknown>))
.toContain('run_in_background')
})
})
describe('background execution through the task runtime', () => {
it('run_in_background acks with the task id, readable through the REAL task_output tool', async () => {
const ctx = await setupWithTasks()
const started = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo bg-ok', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
expect(started.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(started)).toBe('started background task bash-1')
const read = await callUntilText(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1' }, 'bg-ok')
expect(text(read)).toContain('bg-ok')
// A later read reports the terminal outcome in the generic status line.
const final = await callUntilText(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1' }, '[status: completed, exit code: 0]')
expect(final.isError).toBe(false)
})
it('a running background task is killable through the REAL task_kill tool', async () => {
const ctx = await setupWithTasks()
await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
const killed = await call(ctx, 'task_kill', { task_id: 'bash-1' })
expect(text(killed)).toBe('requested cancellation of task bash-1')
// The cancel reached the process handle; the task settles as killed with
// the signal detail mapped by processOutcome.
const final = await call(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1', wait: true })
expect(text(final)).toContain('[status: killed, signal: SIGTERM]')
})
it('a self-signal background exit is reported as killed through the REAL task_output tool', async () => {
const ctx = await setupWithTasks()
await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'kill -TERM $$', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
const final = await call(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1', wait: true })
expect(text(final)).toContain('[status: killed, signal: SIGTERM]')
})
it('a background task started by an agent is registered with that agent as owner', async () => {
// The producer must forward exec.agent as the task owner.
const ctx = await setupWithTasks()
const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'sess-owner')
const started = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true }, agent)
expect(text(started)).toBe('started background task bash-1')
const anon = await call(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1' })
expect(anon.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(anon)).toMatch(/belongs to another session/)
const killed = await call(ctx, 'task_kill', { task_id: 'bash-1' }, agent)
expect(killed.isError).toBe(false)
await call(ctx, 'task_output', { task_id: 'bash-1', wait: true }, agent) // await settlement — no orphan
})
it('fails loud when the task runtime is not loaded', async () => {
const ctx = await setup() // no TaskService / ToolTasks
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('background tasks unavailable: load @deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks and @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks')
})
it('a pre-aborted call refuses to start: isError, no process spawned', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
await ctx.plugin(ToolTasks)
await ctx.plugin(CountingStartExecutor)
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
const controller = new AbortController()
controller.abort()
const result = await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('call-pre-aborted'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true },
signal: controller.signal,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('command aborted')
expect((ctx.bash as CountingStartExecutor).starts).toBe(0)
})
it('never spawns the process when tasks.start preflight throws (no orphan, by construction)', async () => {
// With no control surface, task preflight fails before the executor can spawn.
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
await ctx.plugin(CountingStartExecutor)
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'sleep 60', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('no control surface is attached')
// Declare-then-execute: the failed preflight means no process ever ran.
expect((ctx.bash as CountingStartExecutor).starts).toBe(0)
})
it('enableRunInBackground: false removes the parameter and flips the description', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(LocalBashExecutor, {})
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash, { enableRunInBackground: false })
const schema = ctx.tools.schemas().find(s => s.name === 'bash')!
expect(Object.keys(schema.parameters.properties as Record<string, unknown>))
.toEqual(['command', 'description', 'timeoutMs', 'workdir'])
expect(schema.description).toContain('Background execution is not available')
expect(schema.description).not.toContain('run_in_background')
// The registry-held definition agrees (schema and capability never disagree).
const parameters = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.parameters as { properties: Record<string, unknown> }
expect('run_in_background' in parameters.properties).toBe(false)
// Schema omission is advertising; execution must also enforce the opt-out.
const forced = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo hi', description: 'test command', run_in_background: true })
expect(forced.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(forced)).toContain('run_in_background is disabled for this deployment')
const foreground = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'echo hi', description: 'test command' })
expect(foreground.isError).toBe(false)
})
})
describe('sandbox escalation through the generic task producer', () => {
const escalate = {
command: 'true',
description: 'test escalation',
sandbox_permissions: 'workspace-write',
justification: 'the command needs workspace writes',
}
it('advertises the sandbox fields and validates their pairing', async () => {
const { ctx } = await setupSandboxed()
const schema = ctx.tools.schemas().find(item => item.name === 'bash')!
const properties = schema.parameters.properties as Record<string, { enum?: string[] }>
expect(properties['sandbox_permissions']?.enum).toEqual(['workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'])
expect(schema.description).toContain('approval prompt')
for (const args of [
{ command: 'true', description: 'd', sandbox_permissions: 'workspace-write' },
{ command: 'true', description: 'd', justification: 'why' },
{ command: 'true', description: 'd', sandbox_permissions: 'workspace-write', justification: ' ' },
]) {
expect((await call(ctx, 'bash', args)).isError).toBe(true)
}
})
it('rejects injected escalation without a sandbox and non-widening escalation without prompting', async () => {
const plain = await setup()
expect(text(await call(plain, 'bash', escalate))).toContain('not available in this composition')
const { ctx } = await setupSandboxed(true)
const prompted = vi.fn()
ctx.on('approval/request', () => { prompted(); return Promise.resolve<ApprovalOutcome>('allowed-once') })
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { ...escalate, sandbox_permissions: 'workspace-write' }, sandboxAgent('workspace-write'))
expect(text(result)).toContain('not strictly wider')
expect(prompted).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
const malformed = sandboxAgent()
;(malformed.session.events as unknown as Array<{ type: string; data: { mode: string } }>).push({
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox # Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.golden.json # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/bwrap.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/sandbox.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/seatbelt.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/render.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tsconfig.json # pnpm-lock.yaml # scripts/verify-package-readme-model-experience.ts
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type: 'sandbox/mode',
data: { mode: 'unknown-mode' },
})
expect(text(await call(ctx, 'bash', escalate, malformed))).toContain('not strictly wider')
})
it('fails closed when approval cannot be routed', async () => {
const withoutService = await setupSandboxed()
expect(text(await call(withoutService.ctx, 'bash', escalate, sandboxAgent()))).toContain('no approval service')
const withService = await setupSandboxed(true)
expect(text(await call(withService.ctx, 'bash', escalate))).toContain('no agent to route')
expect(text(await call(withService.ctx, 'bash', escalate, sandboxAgent()))).toContain('no approval channel')
})
it.each([
['rejected', 'user rejected'],
['cancelled', 'was cancelled'],
] as const)('maps an approval %s to its distinct failure', async (outcome, message) => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupSandboxed(true)
ctx.on('approval/request', () => Promise.resolve<ApprovalOutcome>(outcome))
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', escalate, sandboxAgent())
expect(text(result)).toContain(message)
expect(bash.modes).toEqual([])
})
it('runs a granted foreground or background call under the approved mode', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupSandboxed(true)
ctx.on('approval/request', () => Promise.resolve<ApprovalOutcome>('allowed-once'))
const agent = sandboxAgent(undefined, ctx)
ctx.agents.register(agent)
const foreground = await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('sandbox-signal'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: escalate,
agent,
signal: new AbortController().signal,
})
expect(foreground.isError).toBe(false)
const background = await call(ctx, 'bash', { ...escalate, run_in_background: true }, agent)
expect(text(background)).toBe('started background task bash-1')
expect(bash.modes).toEqual(['workspace-write', 'workspace-write'])
})
it('uses the session override for ordinary calls and evaluates widening against it', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupSandboxed(true)
const agent = sandboxAgent('workspace-write')
await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'true', description: 'ordinary' }, agent)
ctx.on('approval/request', () => Promise.resolve<ApprovalOutcome>('allowed-once'))
await call(ctx, 'bash', { ...escalate, sandbox_permissions: 'danger-full-access' }, agent)
expect(bash.modes).toEqual(['workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'])
})
it('keeps the exhaustiveness backstop for a rogue approval implementation', async () => {
const { ctx } = await setupSandboxed(true)
ctx.approval.request = () => Promise.resolve('rogue' as ApprovalOutcome)
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', escalate, sandboxAgent())
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox # Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.golden.json # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/bwrap.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/sandbox.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/seatbelt.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/render.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tsconfig.json # pnpm-lock.yaml # scripts/verify-package-readme-model-experience.ts
2026-07-16 23:31:51 +08:00
expect(text(result)).toContain('unreachable variant in EscalationOutcome')
})
})
describe('renderProcessRead', () => {
const base: BashProcessRead = { delta: 'out\n', lossy: false }
it('returns the delta verbatim for a lossless read', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead(base)).toBe('out\n')
expect(renderProcessRead({ delta: '', lossy: false })).toBe('')
})
it('appends the loss notice with the available spill paths', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead({ ...base, lossy: true, stdoutSpillPath: '/spill/out.log' }))
.toBe('out\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: /spill/out.log]')
expect(renderProcessRead({ ...base, lossy: true, stdoutSpillPath: '/spill/out.log', stderrSpillPath: '/spill/err.log' }))
.toBe('out\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: /spill/out.log, /spill/err.log]')
})
it('reports (unavailable) when a lossy read has no safe spill path', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead({ ...base, lossy: true }))
.toBe('out\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: (unavailable)]')
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
})
it('an empty lossy delta is the notice alone', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead({ delta: '', lossy: true, stderrSpillPath: '/spill/err.log' }))
.toBe('[some output was dropped from memory; full output: /spill/err.log]')
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
})
it('inserts the separating newline only when the delta lacks one', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead({ delta: 'tail', lossy: true }))
.toBe('tail\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: (unavailable)]')
expect(renderProcessRead({ delta: 'tail\n', lossy: true }))
.toBe('tail\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: (unavailable)]')
})
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
it('appends settled sandbox denial and runner-failure facts', () => {
expect(renderProcessRead(base, { mode: 'read-only', denied: true }, ['workspace-write']))
.toContain('[sandbox: escalation available')
expect(renderProcessRead({ delta: 'tail', lossy: false }, { mode: 'read-only', denied: true }))
.toBe('tail\n[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]')
const runner = renderProcessRead(
{ delta: '', lossy: false },
{ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, runnerFailed: true },
['danger-full-access'],
)
expect(runner).toContain('sandbox runner itself failed under workspace-write mode')
expect(runner).not.toContain('file access denied')
})
})
describe('processOutcome', () => {
function settled(over: Partial<BashProcess>): BashProcess {
return {
status: 'completed',
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
done: Promise.resolve(),
readOutput: () => ({ delta: '', lossy: false }),
kill: () => false,
...over,
}
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
}
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
it('maps a signal-killed process to killed with the signal detail', () => {
expect(processOutcome(settled({ status: 'killed', signal: 'SIGTERM' })))
.toEqual({ status: 'killed', detail: 'signal: SIGTERM' })
refactor(tool-bash): own background tasks by session token, not a plugin-local Map Delete the `taskOwner: Map<string, Agent>` entirely — it served two roles (access control AND holding a live Agent for completion notices), both now stateless: - Access control: `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token (`exec.agent?.session.header.id`) with `!== undefined` semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The owner is stamped at spawn via `resolve({ …, owner })`. Ownership now lives on the task in the executor, so it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. - Completion notice: `onTaskDone` reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and finds the live agent by scanning `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for a matching `session.header.id` (read via `ctx.get` — the listener runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). No registry / owner gone → drop the notice cleanly. Token is `session.header.id` (NOT `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id, and the test fakes populate only `session.header.id`, so reading `session.id` would make every fake unowned and pass the isolation tests for the wrong reason. Tests give A and B DISTINCT real session tokens (a same-token-different-Agent case is now ALLOWED — identity no longer matters); the HMR test inverts to assert ownership SURVIVES a tool-bash reload; a new test covers the owner-agent-gone-before-completion drop. Migrates the agent-lifecycle RFC proposed->implemented (recording all three seams + the session-id-uniqueness precondition) and updates the tool-bash README + the now-implemented RFC's cross-links.
2026-06-20 08:14:27 +08:00
})
it('maps a killed process without a recorded signal (kill raced exit / spawn failure)', () => {
expect(processOutcome(settled({ status: 'killed', exitCode: null })))
.toEqual({ status: 'killed', detail: 'killed before exit' })
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
})
it('maps a completed process to its exit code', () => {
expect(processOutcome(settled({ exitCode: 3 })))
.toEqual({ status: 'completed', detail: 'exit code: 3' })
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
})
it('defensively reads a null exit code as 0 (handle shapes from other executors)', () => {
expect(processOutcome(settled({ exitCode: null })))
.toEqual({ status: 'completed', detail: 'exit code: 0' })
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
})
})
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
describe('session-cwd routing (per-session workdir)', () => {
// An agent whose session header carries a cwd (what session/new records).
const agentInCwd = (cwd: string) =>
({ inject: () => undefined, session: { header: { version: 0, id: 'c', createdAt: 0, cwd } } }) as unknown as Agent
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
it('defaults bash to the agent\'s session cwd (not the server launch dir)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd' }, agentInCwd('/tmp'))
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
expect(text(result).trim()).toMatch(/\/tmp$/)
})
it('an explicit absolute workdir overrides the session cwd', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd', workdir: '/tmp' }, agentInCwd('/'))
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
expect(text(result).trim()).toMatch(/\/tmp$/)
})
it('a relative workdir is resolved against the session cwd', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
// session cwd /usr + relative 'bin' → /usr/bin
const result = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd', workdir: 'bin' }, agentInCwd('/usr'))
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
expect(text(result).trim()).toMatch(/\/usr\/bin$/)
})
it('two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const inUsr = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd' }, agentInCwd('/usr'))
const inTmp = await call(ctx, 'bash', { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd' }, agentInCwd('/tmp'))
feat(acp): honor per-session cwd — run each ACP session in its own workspace Lifts the RFC 010 § Deferred restriction that the server had to launch in the workspace ("cwd must equal the launch directory"). An editor can now open any project folder, and N concurrent sessions over one connection can each target a different directory. - packages/acp: drop the `cwd === process.cwd()` guard in validateWorkspaceParams (keep "must be absolute" — the cwd becomes the session header / bash workdir), and drop the persisted-cwd-vs-launch-dir check in session/load (a resumed session keeps its original header.cwd, so its bash tools run in its workspace). - packages/tool-bash: the missing link — default the bash workdir to the calling agent's session cwd (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`) via a new resolveWorkdir helper. An explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against the session cwd. This is the only correct spot for multi-session: N sessions share one ctx.bash executor, so the workdir must come per-call from exec.agent, not executor config. Falls back to the executor default when no session cwd is available (preserves non-ACP behavior). - Trust: the cwd originates from the ACP client (the user's editor) at session/new — same trust level as the old launch dir; no new untrusted-input path. `additionalDirectories` (scope widening / sandbox) stays rejected. - Tests: bridge accepts any absolute cwd + records it on the header; session/load honors the persisted cwd; bash defaults to / resolves relative against the session cwd; two sessions with different cwds each run bash in their own dir; non-absolute cwd still rejected. 100% per-file coverage maintained. - Docs: RFC 010 status + § Deferred cwd bullet marked RESOLVED; acp README adds a Per-session cwd section; tool-bash + example READMEs and e2e comments updated.
2026-06-17 10:01:18 +08:00
expect(text(inUsr).trim()).toMatch(/\/usr$/)
expect(text(inTmp).trim()).toMatch(/\/tmp$/)
})
it('falls back to the executor default when the agent has no session cwd', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
// No exec.agent at all → executor uses its config/process.cwd() default.
const result = await ctx.tools.execute({ callId: CallId('cwd-noagent'), name: 'bash', arguments: { command: 'pwd', description: 'pwd' } })
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result).trim().length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
})
})
describe('renderResult', () => {
const base = {
exitCode: 0 as number | null,
signal: null as NodeJS.Signals | null,
timedOut: false,
aborted: false,
timeoutMs: 1000,
stdout: { text: '', truncated: false },
stderr: { text: '', truncated: false },
}
it('renders stderr-only output without a stdout prefix', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, stderr: { text: 'err\n', truncated: false } }))
.toBe('[stderr]\nerr\n')
})
it('adds a separator when stdout does not end with a newline', () => {
expect(renderResult({
...base,
stdout: { text: 'out', truncated: false },
stderr: { text: 'err', truncated: false },
})).toBe('out\n[stderr]\nerr')
})
it('appends exit-code markers after a newline for unterminated output', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, exitCode: 7, stdout: { text: 'x', truncated: false } }))
.toBe('x\n[exit code: 7]')
})
it('renders signal kills without the timeout marker when not timed out', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, exitCode: null, signal: 'SIGKILL' }))
.toBe('(no output)\n[killed by signal: SIGKILL]')
})
it('reports a timeout that exited 0 (trapped signal) without a kill marker', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, exitCode: 0, signal: null, timedOut: true }))
.toBe('(no output)\n[timed out after 1000ms]')
})
it('orders the timeout marker before a kill marker', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, exitCode: null, signal: 'SIGTERM', timedOut: true }))
.toBe('(no output)\n[timed out after 1000ms]\n[killed by signal: SIGTERM]')
})
it('notes truncation with a fallback when the spill path is missing', () => {
expect(renderResult({ ...base, stdout: { text: 'tail', truncated: true } }))
.toBe('tail\n[output truncated; full output: (unavailable)]')
})
it('reports sandbox denials before exit status and hints only when escalation is advertised', () => {
const result: BashRunResult = {
exitCode: 1,
signal: null,
timedOut: false,
aborted: false,
timeoutMs: 1000,
stdout: { text: '', truncated: false },
stderr: { text: 'denied', truncated: false },
sandbox: { mode: 'read-only', denied: true },
}
expect(renderResult(result)).toMatch(/denied under read-only mode\]\n\[exit code: 1\]$/)
expect(renderResult(result, ['workspace-write'])).toContain('[sandbox: escalation available')
expect(renderResult({ ...result, sandbox: { mode: 'read-only', denied: false } }, ['workspace-write']))
.not.toContain('[sandbox:')
})
})
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
describe('tool-owned UI presentation (presentCall / presentResult)', () => {
it('bash presentCall: a foreground run is a terminal card (command title, description, workdir → cwd absolute or relative)', async () => {
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
const ctx = await setup()
// No explicit workdir → a terminal card with no cwd (the UI bridge fills the
// session cwd it owns; the pure presenter can't see it).
feat(acp): render bash as a terminal card via the _meta convention When the client advertises clientCapabilities._meta.terminal_output (Zed), a bash tool call now renders as a real TERMINAL card — a cwd header + the command + its output — instead of the plain ```console text block. Keeps agent-side dsh-bash execution; rejects the spec's client-side terminal/create (which would bypass sandbox/env-scrub/ownership/cwd). Matches what claude-agent-acp and codex-acp do; wire contract verified against Zed's source. - dsh-tools: a provider-neutral ToolTerminal shape ({ cwd?, output? }) on ToolCallPresentation/ToolResultPresentation — a tool asks "render me as a terminal"; no ACP types leak in. - dsh-tool-bash: bash presentCall marks terminal (cwd from an explicit absolute workdir, else left for the bridge to fill from the session cwd); presentResult carries the output alongside the ```console fallback. - dsh-acp: initialize reads/remembers the _meta.terminal_output capability; streamSessionEventUpdate maps a terminal presentation to content:[{type:'terminal',terminalId}] + _meta.terminal_info on the call and _meta.terminal_output on the update WHEN capable — else the unchanged text path. terminalId is the callId; cwd defaults to the session header. The pure translator gained a TerminalRendering {enabled,cwd} param (off by default). Tests via the REAL tool-bash + bash-local: capability ON -> terminal content + _meta; OFF -> no _meta (text path). The with-key e2e adds a real-model terminal card case (echo over ACP with the capability on). 773 tests, 100% coverage. The exit-status pill (_meta.terminal_exit), live streaming (_meta.terminal_output_delta), and command classification are RFC follow-ups.
2026-06-18 17:25:09 +08:00
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')?.presentCall?.({ command: 'ls -la src', description: 'List files in src' }))
.toEqual({ card: 'terminal', title: 'ls -la src', description: 'List files in src' })
// An ABSOLUTE workdir is surfaced verbatim as the terminal cwd header.
feat(acp): render bash as a terminal card via the _meta convention When the client advertises clientCapabilities._meta.terminal_output (Zed), a bash tool call now renders as a real TERMINAL card — a cwd header + the command + its output — instead of the plain ```console text block. Keeps agent-side dsh-bash execution; rejects the spec's client-side terminal/create (which would bypass sandbox/env-scrub/ownership/cwd). Matches what claude-agent-acp and codex-acp do; wire contract verified against Zed's source. - dsh-tools: a provider-neutral ToolTerminal shape ({ cwd?, output? }) on ToolCallPresentation/ToolResultPresentation — a tool asks "render me as a terminal"; no ACP types leak in. - dsh-tool-bash: bash presentCall marks terminal (cwd from an explicit absolute workdir, else left for the bridge to fill from the session cwd); presentResult carries the output alongside the ```console fallback. - dsh-acp: initialize reads/remembers the _meta.terminal_output capability; streamSessionEventUpdate maps a terminal presentation to content:[{type:'terminal',terminalId}] + _meta.terminal_info on the call and _meta.terminal_output on the update WHEN capable — else the unchanged text path. terminalId is the callId; cwd defaults to the session header. The pure translator gained a TerminalRendering {enabled,cwd} param (off by default). Tests via the REAL tool-bash + bash-local: capability ON -> terminal content + _meta; OFF -> no _meta (text path). The with-key e2e adds a real-model terminal card case (echo over ACP with the capability on). 773 tests, 100% coverage. The exit-status pill (_meta.terminal_exit), live streaming (_meta.terminal_output_delta), and command classification are RFC follow-ups.
2026-06-18 17:25:09 +08:00
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')?.presentCall?.({ command: 'pwd', description: 'Print dir', workdir: '/tmp/x' }))
.toEqual({ card: 'terminal', title: 'pwd', description: 'Print dir', cwd: '/tmp/x' })
// A RELATIVE workdir is passed through AS-IS (the bridge resolves it against
// the session cwd, matching where execution runs) — not dropped.
feat(acp): render bash as a terminal card via the _meta convention When the client advertises clientCapabilities._meta.terminal_output (Zed), a bash tool call now renders as a real TERMINAL card — a cwd header + the command + its output — instead of the plain ```console text block. Keeps agent-side dsh-bash execution; rejects the spec's client-side terminal/create (which would bypass sandbox/env-scrub/ownership/cwd). Matches what claude-agent-acp and codex-acp do; wire contract verified against Zed's source. - dsh-tools: a provider-neutral ToolTerminal shape ({ cwd?, output? }) on ToolCallPresentation/ToolResultPresentation — a tool asks "render me as a terminal"; no ACP types leak in. - dsh-tool-bash: bash presentCall marks terminal (cwd from an explicit absolute workdir, else left for the bridge to fill from the session cwd); presentResult carries the output alongside the ```console fallback. - dsh-acp: initialize reads/remembers the _meta.terminal_output capability; streamSessionEventUpdate maps a terminal presentation to content:[{type:'terminal',terminalId}] + _meta.terminal_info on the call and _meta.terminal_output on the update WHEN capable — else the unchanged text path. terminalId is the callId; cwd defaults to the session header. The pure translator gained a TerminalRendering {enabled,cwd} param (off by default). Tests via the REAL tool-bash + bash-local: capability ON -> terminal content + _meta; OFF -> no _meta (text path). The with-key e2e adds a real-model terminal card case (echo over ACP with the capability on). 773 tests, 100% coverage. The exit-status pill (_meta.terminal_exit), live streaming (_meta.terminal_output_delta), and command classification are RFC follow-ups.
2026-06-18 17:25:09 +08:00
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')?.presentCall?.({ command: 'pwd', description: 'Print dir', workdir: 'sub' }))
.toEqual({ card: 'terminal', title: 'pwd', description: 'Print dir', cwd: 'sub' })
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
})
it('bash presentResult: a terminal result carries RAW output (newlines intact) + parsed exit code', async () => {
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
const ctx = await setup()
const present = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(
{ command: 'echo hi', description: 'echo' },
{ content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hi\n[exit code: 0]\n\n' }], isError: false },
)
// A terminal result keeps the RAW bytes (newlines intact) a terminal renderer
// needs; the bridge derives the fenced fallback. exitCode is parsed back from
// the [exit code: N] marker.
expect(present).toEqual({ card: 'terminal', output: 'hi\n[exit code: 0]\n\n', exitCode: 0 })
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
})
it('bash presentResult: a non-zero exit and a signal kill parse into exitCode / signal', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const args = { command: 'x', description: 'x' }
const nonzero = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'oops\n[exit code: 3]' }], isError: false })
expect(nonzero).toEqual({ card: 'terminal', output: 'oops\n[exit code: 3]', exitCode: 3 })
const killed = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'gone\n[killed by signal: SIGKILL]' }], isError: false })
expect(killed).toEqual({ card: 'terminal', output: 'gone\n[killed by signal: SIGKILL]', signal: 'SIGKILL' })
})
it('bash presentResult exit parse is the inverse of renderResult markers (round-trip)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const present = ctx.tools.get('bash')!
// For each renderResult outcome, the rendered text fed back through
// presentResult recovers the matching structured exit — the parse and the
// marker emission co-evolve in one file, so this pins the pair.
const base = {
aborted: false,
timeoutMs: 1000,
stdout: { text: 'out', truncated: false },
stderr: { text: '', truncated: false },
}
const cases = [
{ result: { ...base, exitCode: 0, signal: null, timedOut: false }, expect: { exitCode: 0 } },
{ result: { ...base, exitCode: 7, signal: null, timedOut: false }, expect: { exitCode: 7 } },
{ result: { ...base, exitCode: null, signal: 'SIGTERM' as const, timedOut: false }, expect: { signal: 'SIGTERM' } },
// A trapped-timeout run that exits 0 has no signal/exit marker → reads as exit 0 (it did exit 0).
{ result: { ...base, exitCode: 0, signal: null, timedOut: true }, expect: { exitCode: 0 } },
]
for (const c of cases) {
const rendered = renderResult(c.result)
const out = present.presentResult!({ command: 'x', description: 'x' }, { content: [{ type: 'text', text: rendered }], isError: false })
// Drop card + output; the remaining fields are the parsed exit.
const { card: _c, output: _o, ...exit } = out as { card: string; output?: string; exitCode?: number; signal?: string }
expect(exit).toEqual(c.expect)
}
})
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
it('bash presentResult: a clean exit-0 whose output ENDS in marker-like text is NOT read as a failure', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const args = { command: 'printf "[exit code: 5]"', description: 'print' }
// A successful command may print marker-like text. A clean result appends no marker or
// newline; parsing requires the leading newline emitted for real markers, so this stays exit 0.
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const out = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, { content: [{ type: 'text', text: '[exit code: 5]' }], isError: false })
expect(out).toEqual({ card: 'terminal', output: '[exit code: 5]', exitCode: 0 })
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
// Same for a fake signal marker with no leading newline.
const sig = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, { content: [{ type: 'text', text: '[killed by signal: SIGKILL]' }], isError: false })
expect(sig).toEqual({ card: 'terminal', output: '[killed by signal: SIGKILL]', exitCode: 0 })
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
})
it('bash presentCall/presentResult: a run_in_background call is a generic card and its ack carries no exit pill', async () => {
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const ctx = await setup()
// The background start returns a task-id ack, not a streamed run — a generic
// execute card with the command as rawInput and the description as content.
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const call = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentCall!({ command: 'sleep 100', description: 'wait', run_in_background: true })
expect(call).toEqual({ card: 'generic', title: 'sleep 100', kind: 'execute', rawInput: 'sleep 100', content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'wait' }] })
// The ack result is a generic fenced-text card — no terminal output / exit pill.
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const result = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(
{ command: 'sleep 100', description: 'wait', run_in_background: true },
{ content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'started background task bash-1' }], isError: false },
)
expect(result).toEqual({ card: 'generic', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '```console\nstarted background task bash-1\n```' }] })
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
})
it('bash presentResult: an isError result is a generic card (no real process exit to report)', async () => {
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const ctx = await setup()
// A spawn failure / abort has no process exit — the body is an error message,
// not renderResult output, so a generic fenced card, no terminal output/exit.
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
const out = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(
{ command: 'x', description: 'x' },
{ content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'command aborted' }], isError: true },
)
expect(out).toEqual({ card: 'generic', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '```console\ncommand aborted\n```' }] })
fix(acp): address review of the terminal-card alignment (exit parse, background/error, capability snapshot) Codex + an independent review pass found three real defects in the prior commit: 1. parseExitStatus could misreport a SUCCESSFUL command as a failure: a clean exit 0 appends no marker, so output ending in "[exit code: 5]" (no trailing newline) was read as the marker. Anchor the parse to a LEADING newline — renderResult always inserts one before a real marker, so a body that merely ends in marker-like text no longer matches. A narrow residual (a clean exit 0 whose final line is exactly the marker) is inherent to the replay-only-sees- text design and documented; the complete fix (a structured exit on the event) is the RFC's named escape hatch. 2. A run_in_background start and an isError result were rendered as exited terminal cards with a false exit-0 pill. A background start returns a task-id ack (not a streamed terminal) and is no longer marked terminal; an isError result (spawn failure / abort) carries no exit pill. 3. The terminal capability was re-read live on the result path, so a second initialize between a call and its result could desync them (orphan terminal_output or clobbered card). Snapshot the capability per session at creation (SessionRecord.terminalEnabled) so call and result always agree. Also reword the reference-parity claim: keeping the description as a content block in terminal mode is a DELIBERATE divergence (claude-agent-acp drops it). Tests added for each; with-key e2e still green.
2026-06-18 19:35:15 +08:00
})
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
it('bash presentResult: leaves a non-text (unexpected) result untouched → undefined (UI keeps raw content)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const present = ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(
{ command: 'x', description: 'x' },
refactor(llm): drop the image content block until a path can honor it ImageBlock had no production producer and every consumer dropped it: the deepseek serializer skipped it, the pi-ai converter skipped it as unrepresentable, the ACP bridge neither advertises image prompt capability nor forwards image blocks, and compact-basic charged a flat 85-token estimate and rendered an [image] placeholder. A block constructed today would silently vanish from the wire — the vocabulary advertised a capability no path honors, the silent-data-loss shape the defensive patterns warn against. The only constructors were tests pinning the skip/estimate branches. Remove ImageBlock and its ContentBlockMap entry (its cache?: CacheHint field leaves with it; CacheHint itself and the other two cache? fields are out of scope). compact-basic loses its explicit image estimate and placeholder arms (the merge-extensible default arms absorb the case); the deepseek serializer, pi-ai converter, and ACP codec already handled image in their default arms, so only their image-naming comments change. The codec's inbound rejection of ACP-protocol image prompt content stays — that guards wire content a client can send regardless of our vocabulary. Tests that constructed harness image blocks to pin the removed branches are dropped (the 85-token estimate pin) or retargeted onto plugin-added block types / other non-text blocks, which the surviving default arms own. Docs, the type-equiv pastes, and the content-block vocabulary RFC's block list and multimodal-home consequence are updated in the same change; the RFC moves to implemented/ and the index is regenerated. A real multimodal feature reintroduces image via declaration merging together with the adapter mapping, ACP advertisement, and compaction pricing that honor it.
2026-07-04 17:21:13 +08:00
{ content: [{ type: 'reasoning', text: 'unexpected' }], isError: false },
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
)
expect(present).toBeUndefined()
})
it('bash presentResult: a result that is not exactly one block → undefined (no single text to fence)', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const args = { command: 'x', description: 'x' }
// Empty content (no block) and multi-block content both fall through.
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, { content: [], isError: false })).toBeUndefined()
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')!.presentResult!(args, {
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'a' }, { type: 'text', text: 'b' }],
isError: false,
})).toBeUndefined()
})
it('presentCall validates softly: malformed args (missing required description) return undefined, never throw', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
// `defineTool` soft-validates replayed logged args before presentation. Invalid shapes return
// undefined for generic UI rendering rather than throwing; `presentCall` accepts `unknown`.
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
2026-06-18 09:01:36 +08:00
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')?.presentCall?.({ command: 'ls' })).toBeUndefined()
})
})
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no {...args} forward)', () => {
const recordingDshHome = join(spillDir, 'dsh-home')
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
/**
* Records every {@link BashExecRequest} the consumer hands to `resolve()`, so a
* test can assert what the model-facing tool DID and DID NOT forward. The `bash`
* tool does not expose trusted-plugin fields (`stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, or
* `env`) as parameters, so it must build its request from named args only and
* never spread unknown tool-call keys into it. This guard's job is to catch a
* future refactor that blindly forwards `...args` — which would silently thread
* model input into the post-scrub `env` merge or per-run capture budget — NOT
* to defend a trust boundary
* (the credential scrub in dsh-bash-local is the security control; see the
2026-07-19 22:50:49 +08:00
* bash-stdin-env Agent Note). Foreground `run()` returns a canned result; `start()`
* hands back an already-settled fake handle so the task registration completes.
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
*/
class RecordingBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
readonly requests: BashExecRequest[] = []
resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
this.requests.push(request)
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
...request.env !== undefined ? { env: request.env } : {},
...request.dshEnv !== undefined ? { dshEnv: request.dshEnv } : {},
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
}
}
run(): Promise<BashRunResult> {
return Promise.resolve({
exitCode: 0, signal: null, timedOut: false, aborted: false, timeoutMs: 0,
stdout: { text: 'ok', truncated: false }, stderr: { text: '', truncated: false },
})
}
start(): BashProcess {
return {
status: 'completed',
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
done: Promise.resolve(),
readOutput: () => ({ delta: '', lossy: false }),
kill: () => false,
}
}
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
}
async function setupRecording(withJsonl = false) {
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
if (withJsonl) {
await ctx.plugin(SessionStore)
await ctx.plugin(SessionPersistenceJsonl, { root: join(spillDir, 'jsonl') })
}
await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
await ctx.plugin(ToolTasks)
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
await ctx.plugin(RecordingBashExecutor)
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash, { dshHome: recordingDshHome })
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
return { ctx, bash: ctx.bash as RecordingBashExecutor }
}
it('describes the managed harness environment namespace to the model', async () => {
const { ctx } = await setupRecording()
const description = ctx.tools.get('bash')?.description ?? ''
expect(description).toContain('$DSH_*')
expect(description).not.toContain('DSH_SESSION_JSONL')
})
it('injects the session id and JSONL target path into a foreground request', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-fg', () => undefined)
const path = ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(agent.session.header)?.path
await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('session-env-fg'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
agent,
})
expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-fg',
DSH_SESSION_JSONL: path,
DSH_SHELL: '1',
})
})
it('injects the same trusted variables into a background request without forwarding model env', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-bg', () => undefined)
const path = ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(agent.session.header)?.path
await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('session-env-bg'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: {
command: 'sleep 1',
description: 'run command',
run_in_background: true,
env: { DSH_SESSION_ID: 'spoofed', DSH_SESSION_JSONL: '/tmp/spoofed' },
},
agent,
})
expect(bash.requests[0]?.env).toBeUndefined()
expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-bg',
DSH_SESSION_JSONL: path,
DSH_SHELL: '1',
})
})
it('injects built-ins and the stable session id when no JSONL locator is available', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-id-only', () => undefined)
const ambient = process.env.DSH_SESSION_ID
await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('session-env-id-only'),
name: 'bash',
arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
agent,
})
expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-id-only',
DSH_SHELL: '1',
})
expect(process.env.DSH_SESSION_ID).toBe(ambient)
})
it('keeps parent and child agent session environments isolated', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
const parent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-parent', () => undefined)
const child = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-child', () => undefined)
for (const [callId, agent] of [['parent', parent], ['child', child]] as const) {
await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId(`session-env-${callId}`),
name: 'bash',
arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
agent,
})
}
expect(bash.requests.map(request => request.dshEnv)).toEqual([
{
DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-parent',
DSH_SESSION_JSONL: ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(parent.session.header)?.path,
DSH_SHELL: '1',
},
{
DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-child',
DSH_SESSION_JSONL: ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(child.session.header)?.path,
DSH_SHELL: '1',
},
])
expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv?.DSH_SESSION_JSONL).not.toBe(bash.requests[1]?.dshEnv?.DSH_SESSION_JSONL)
})
it('does not forward trusted-only fields even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
// Unknown `env` and `stdin` keys are ignored by the schema and named request construction.
// This preserves the request shape; it is not a security boundary because shell syntax can
// already set environment variables or feed stdin.
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('no-forward-1'),
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
name: 'bash',
arguments: {
command: 'echo hi',
description: 'echo',
env: { SNEAKY_API_KEY: 'leak' },
stdin: 'malicious payload',
stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
},
})
expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
const request = bash.requests[0]!
expect(request.command).toBe('echo hi')
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
})
it('a background bash call likewise carries no trusted-only fields', async () => {
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
const result = await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('no-forward-2'),
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
name: 'bash',
arguments: {
command: 'sleep 1',
description: 'sleep',
run_in_background: true,
env: { TOKEN: 'leak' },
stdin: 'x',
stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
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},
})
// The call really went down the background path (the recorder sees the real
// request the consumer built, so the absent env/stdin below is a real
// negative, not a recorder that drops everything).
expect(text(result)).toBe('started background task bash-1')
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
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expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
const request = bash.requests[0]!
expect(request.command).toBe('sleep 1')
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
2026-06-30 13:52:25 +08:00
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
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})
})