deepseek-harness/packages/fs/fs-sandbox/package.json

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feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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{
"name": "@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox",
"description": "Sandbox-enforcing implementation of the DeepSeek Harness filesystem seam: fences write/edit by the per-call sandbox mode (read-only denies mutation, workspace-write contains it to the workspace + temp roots) while reads pass through",
"version": "0.0.1",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"main": "lib/index.js",
"types": "lib/types/index.d.ts",
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./lib/types/index.d.ts",
"default": "./lib/index.js"
},
"./invariant": {
"types": "./lib/types/invariant.d.ts",
"default": "./lib/invariant.js"
},
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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"./src/*": "./src/*",
"./package.json": "./package.json"
},
"files": [
"lib/index.js",
"lib/invariant.js",
"lib/types/**/*.d.ts"
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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],
"license": "BSD-3-Clause",
"peerDependencies": {
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "^0.0.1",
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy": "^0.0.1",
build(vendor): rescope the vendored Cordis packages into @deepseek-ai Machine-produced by `pnpm run rescope-vendor --apply` plus the regeneration it prints: `pnpm install` for the lockfile, `pnpm run gen-third-party-notices`, `verify-translation-pairing --write` for the touched bilingual pairs, `gen-doc-graphs`, and one typert snapshot whose ids embed character offsets. `pnpm run rescope-vendor --check` verifies the result. Renames nine vendored packages (cordis, cosmokit, schemastery and the six @cordisjs plugins) and every reference that resolves them: manifest names and dependency keys, module specifiers including declare-module merges, cordis.yml plugin names, tsconfig paths, every Markdown fence, and `docs/` prose. Directory names, upstream versions, and dependency ranges are unchanged, so vendor/README.md still reads as an upstream snapshot; its manifest table gains an upstream-name column so THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES keeps MIT attribution pointed at each fork's origin. The tutorial tier follows the rename end to end: its yaml fences named plugins the Loader can no longer resolve, its `ts ignore-check` fences disagreed with the compiled fences beside them, and its prose quoted both. The contracts that told readers to keep upstream names — the root convention and the vendoring cookbook's tree comment and manifest invariant — now say to rescope instead. Two rules read `@deepseek-ai/` as "another workspace plugin": the client bundle purity gate now names the vendored libraries a browser bundle inlines, and the files where a bare `cordis` is an agent-preset id keep that product data.
2026-08-10 22:04:06 +08:00
"@deepseek-ai/cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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},
"devDependencies": {
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "workspace:^",
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy": "workspace:^",
build(vendor): rescope the vendored Cordis packages into @deepseek-ai Machine-produced by `pnpm run rescope-vendor --apply` plus the regeneration it prints: `pnpm install` for the lockfile, `pnpm run gen-third-party-notices`, `verify-translation-pairing --write` for the touched bilingual pairs, `gen-doc-graphs`, and one typert snapshot whose ids embed character offsets. `pnpm run rescope-vendor --check` verifies the result. Renames nine vendored packages (cordis, cosmokit, schemastery and the six @cordisjs plugins) and every reference that resolves them: manifest names and dependency keys, module specifiers including declare-module merges, cordis.yml plugin names, tsconfig paths, every Markdown fence, and `docs/` prose. Directory names, upstream versions, and dependency ranges are unchanged, so vendor/README.md still reads as an upstream snapshot; its manifest table gains an upstream-name column so THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES keeps MIT attribution pointed at each fork's origin. The tutorial tier follows the rename end to end: its yaml fences named plugins the Loader can no longer resolve, its `ts ignore-check` fences disagreed with the compiled fences beside them, and its prose quoted both. The contracts that told readers to keep upstream names — the root convention and the vendoring cookbook's tree comment and manifest invariant — now say to rescope instead. Two rules read `@deepseek-ai/` as "another workspace plugin": the client bundle purity gate now names the vendored libraries a browser bundle inlines, and the files where a bare `cordis` is an agent-preset id keep that product data.
2026-08-10 22:04:06 +08:00
"@deepseek-ai/cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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}
}