deepseek-harness/packages/bash/tool-bash/README.md

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# @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
The model-facing `bash` tool registered over the `ctx.bash` executor seam. Foreground execution stays behind that seam; a background process handle is registered with the generic `ctx.tasks` runtime and controlled through `task_output`, `task_list`, and `task_kill` from `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks`.
Requires a loaded executor implementation (e.g. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local`); the plugin stays pending until `ctx.bash` exists (`inject: ['tools', 'bash', 'systemPrompt']`).
The package root exposes only the Cordis plugin contract (`name`, `inject`, `Config`, `apply`); result rendering and background-process adaptation remain implementation details covered by same-package tests.
The plugin also contributes the `tool:bash` prompt section (order 105): check the `[exit code: N]` marker on every result and investigate failures before moving on.
## Tools
### `bash`
| Arg | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `command` | string (required) | Run via `bash -c`. No state persists between calls — use `workdir`, not `cd`. |
| `description` | string (required) | One-line, active-voice summary of the command (5-10 words), for UI/log display only — no effect on execution. |
| `timeoutMs` | number | Timeout override in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap. |
| `workdir` | string | Working directory for this call. Defaults to the filesystem identity of the calling agent's session cwd (`session.header.cwd`) so each session runs in its own workspace; a relative `workdir` is resolved against that same identity. |
| `run_in_background` | boolean | Return a task id immediately; no timeout applies. |
| `sandbox_permissions` | string enum | ADVERTISED ONLY when the mounted executor sandboxes (`ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports a confining default): the wider mode a denied command needs, from the closed target vocabulary `workspace-write`/`danger-full-access` (never cut down to the executor's default — the effective mode is per-session; strict widening is checked at execution against it, and a non-widening request fails without prompting anyone). |
| `justification` | string | Required together with `sandbox_permissions` (each without the other is a validation error): one sentence for the user explaining why this exact command needs the wider access. |
`command`, `workdir`, and `timeoutMs` are resolved against the executor's config defaults via `ctx.bash.resolve()` before execution, so the executor seam (`BashExecSpec`) receives explicit `workdir`/`timeoutMs` values. The workdir default is applied in the tool layer from the calling agent's `session.header.cwd` BEFORE `resolve()` — the per-session cwd must come from `exec.agent`, since N sessions share one executor; only when no session cwd is available does the executor fall back to its own config / `process.cwd()`. When sandbox policy is present, the tool reuses its already-canonical `workspaceRoot` as the workdir base so confinement and process launch cannot resolve the same session spelling differently.
### Managed shell environment
Every foreground and background model bash call receives a newly collected trusted `DSH_*` environment. `DSH_HOME` is the absolute Harness home resolved by [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-paths`](../../util/paths/README.md) (`dshHome` config, then ambient `$DSH_HOME`, then `~/.dsh`) and `DSH_SHELL=1` identifies the managed child. Agent calls additionally receive `DSH_SESSION_ID=agent.session.header.id`; when the active persistence seam locates a JSONL artifact they also receive `DSH_SESSION_JSONL=<absolute target path>`. The JSONL path is a location hint: it may not exist before the first flush or contain the current buffered turn, and it is not an authorization credential.
`ctx.bashEnv` owns collection. Other plugins can register an effect-scoped contributor with a stable name, declared keys/descriptions, and `resolve(execution: ToolExecution)`; duplicate ownership and undeclared runtime keys fail loudly, while `list()` enumerates declarations without executing providers. Harness built-ins reserve `DSH_HOME`, `DSH_SHELL`, and `DSH_SESSION_ID`; tool-bash's persistence translator owns `DSH_SESSION_JSONL` by reading the backend-neutral `sessionPersistence.locate()` seam.
```ts
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash'
export const inject = ['bashEnv']
export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
ctx.bashEnv.register({
name: 'deployment-region',
variables: { DSH_DEPLOYMENT_REGION: { description: 'Current deployment region.' } },
resolve: execution => execution.agent === undefined ? {} : { DSH_DEPLOYMENT_REGION: 'cn-north' },
})
}
```
The overlay is computed from the current `ToolExecution` and passed through the dedicated `BashExecRequest.dshEnv` channel. The local executor removes all inherited `DSH_*` before merging that snapshot, so nested harnesses and concurrent parent/child agents cannot leak stale identities. `process.env` is never modified. The tool description teaches the generic `$DSH_*` convention rather than naming persistence-specific variables or adding a permanent system-prompt section.
Result text contains stdout, an optional `[stderr]` section, then applicable sandbox-denial, timeout, signal, exit-code, and truncation markers. Timeout is reported independently of final exit status; nonzero exit remains a model-interpreted result rather than `isError`. Truncation links a safe complete spill file or reports it unavailable. Only infrastructure failures such as spawn errors and aborts produce `isError`.
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The canonical success is `{ kind: 'foreground', ...BashRunResult }` for a completed foreground process or `{ kind: 'background', taskId }` for a published task. The Native renderer preserves the text above, including exactly `started background task <id>`; programmatic consumers use the typed fields without parsing those strings. Executor stream caps remain acquisition limits on `BashRunResult` and carry their spill paths.
When `run_in_background` is true, this plugin preflights `ctx.tasks.start()` before spawning, registers the calling agent as owner, and adapts the returned `BashProcess` handle into generic cancel/done/incremental-output hooks. The task runtime owns ids, cross-session isolation, completion notices, waiting, and disposal cleanup; this plugin only maps bash exit/sandbox facts into task output and outcome detail. `enableRunInBackground: false` removes the parameter and rejects a forced background call at execution time.
feat(acp): multiplex N concurrent ACP sessions + bash task ownership (RFC 011) Lifts the RFC 010 single-session-per-connection cap: the bridge now runs N concurrent sessions over one connection, each mapped to its own LoopAgent. - packages/acp: live sessions held in a Map<sessionId, SessionRecord> with an agent→sessionId reverse WeakMap so agent/* events (which carry only the Agent) demux in O(1). Every session/event and agent/status is routed strictly to its owning record — concurrent sessions never cross-settle or interleave their session/update notifications. Per-session state: one in-flight prompt each, session/cancel aborts+settles only its own agent/prompt, session/load reserves a per-id load slot (distinct ids load concurrently; re-loading a live id is rejected), and disposal drains every live session in parallel to quiescence. - packages/tool-bash: record each background task's owning agent at spawn and keep it for the executor's lifetime (NOT cleared on completion). bash_output/bash_kill reject a task owned by a different agent (a task with no owner is open; a no-agent caller can't access an owned task). Task ids are global and predictable, so this is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading/killing another session's background task. - Per-session permission ownership and a per-agent disposer seam stay deferred (depend on the deferred permission gate); the reverse map the gate will route through is in place. RFC 011 stays `proposed`. - Tests: two sessions stream concurrently without interleave; cross-session cancel isolation; per-session in-flight enforcement; dispose-all-to-quiescence; bash cross-session read/kill rejected (+ no-agent and unowned-task cases). - Docs: RFC 011 implementation-status note; acp + tool-bash READMEs; example MVP-limitations updated. 100% per-file coverage maintained.
2026-06-16 19:23:21 +08:00
feat(acp): tool-owned tool-call UI presentation (title/command/output) In Zed the tool-call card showed only "bash" — the bare tool name — instead of what the command does. Fix it by letting each TOOL own how its calls render, rather than the bridge special-casing names. dsh-tools: add an optional two-state presentation seam to ToolDefinition / defineTool — `presentCall(args)` (pending: title, kind, rawInput) and `presentResult(args, result)` (completed: title?, content?). Provider-neutral `ToolCallKind`/`ToolCallPresentation`/`ToolResultPresentation` vocabulary so tools never depend on ACP. defineTool soft-validates args (display runs on log replay, so a malformed/old shape returns undefined instead of throwing). dsh-tool-bash: bash declares presentCall (model `description` → title, exact `command` → rawInput, kind execute) and presentResult (wrap output in a fenced ```console block — a UI-only affordance kept out of the model-facing result); bash_output/bash_kill present task-scoped titles. dsh-acp: inject `tools`; a per-session `ToolPresenter` looks the tool up by name and maps its neutral presentation to the ACP tool_call/tool_call_update wire shape, with a generic fallback (title = name) for tools that declare nothing. Because the `tool/result` event carries only {callId, content, isError}, the presenter keeps a small bridge-local map of ONLY in-flight calls' (name, args), keyed by callId and removed as each result is presented — no event-schema or core change. Replay uses a throwaway presenter so loaded sessions render identically to live ones. Tests: dsh-tools defineTool presenters (typed args, soft-validate), tool-bash bash/bash_output/bash_kill presenters, acp ToolPresenter (tool-owned mapping, unknown-callId fallback, in-flight-only map), and an end-to-end turn through the bridge. The key-gated e2e now asserts a real bash call's title is the model description (not "bash") and rawInput is the command — verified against the real DeepSeek model. The test harness derives its inject from the bridge's exported `inject` so it can't drift again.
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## UI presentation
The tool owns its `presentCall`/`presentResult` render intent. A foreground call is a terminal card carrying command, description, cwd, raw output, and parsed exit status. A background start is a generic execute card because it returns only a task id; the generic `task_*` tools own their own cards. These presenters are pure and replay-safe.
## The tool builds its request from named args only
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
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The `BashExecRequest` seam carries optional `stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, ordinary `env`, and managed `dshEnv`, used by trusted in-process plugins and this tool's environment registry. The model-facing tool exposes none of `stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, or `env`: it builds requests from named command/workdir/timeout/signal/sandbox fields plus the registry-collected `dshEnv`. Extra model keys are ignored and cannot replace managed values. Shell syntax provides equivalent command-level behavior, while the local executor scrubs ambient credentials and stale `DSH_*` values. See the [stdin/env Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way: JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: - BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun. - dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed. - The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit `env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.
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## Permissions and escalation
Commands run with the executor's full authority unless a sandboxing executor ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/)) confines them — the deny-only sandbox reports denials as result facts, rendered here as the denial marker; per-call allow/deny/ask policy is the `tools/pre-execute` waterfall (see docs/architecture.md).
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Escalating bash calls resolve `ctx.approval` before execution. `allowed-once` applies the requested mode only to that call; rejection, cancellation, unavailability, or missing approval context executes nothing and returns a distinct error. On a real denial, the model may retry the same command once in the same turn with the narrowest sufficient mode and justification; the approval prompt itself is the consent step. Escalation is never speculative, and a disabled or rejected approval is final. The [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) owns the rationale.
## Per-session mode switching
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For sandboxing executors, each call resolves mode as one-shot escalation, then session override, then executor default. Non-sandboxing and agent-less calls carry no session override. Neither the prompt nor a switch notice announces the standing mode; denial results report the effective mode when the boundary matters. See the [`dsh-bash` fold](../bash/README.md) and [sandbox switching contract](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
Add a gated Known Limitations and Deferred Work section to every package README Every packages/*/* README now carries a canonical '## Known Limitations and Deferred Work' section: condensed, evidence-backed bullets for consumer-visible gaps (unimplemented features, platform caveats, MVP cuts) and consciously postponed work (TODO/FIXME/XXX markers, RFC deferrals still open). The ten pre-existing ad-hoc variants ('What is NOT here (TODO)', 'Deferred', 'Limitations (MVP)', 'Known limitations (tracked TODOs)', ...) are normalized into the canonical heading. A new doc-sync gate, scripts/verify-readme-limitations.ts, enforces the shape: exactly one limitations-like heading per package README, byte-equal to the canonical h2, with at least one bullet; near-miss headings fail so variants cannot creep back. Packages with genuinely nothing to declare (dsh-brand, dsh-timeout, dsh-subagent-mock, dsh-app-boot) are whitelisted in the script and must NOT carry the section; whitelist entries are validated against the scanned package set so a rename fails loud. Wired into the doc-sync chain (package.json) and the run-gates doc-sync leaf set; the standing rule lands in packages/AGENTS.md and the adding-a-package cookbook; decision record in docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-10-readme-known-limitations-gate.md (RFC index regenerated). Also fixes two stale '(deferred)' markers claiming dsh-compact-basic is unimplemented (the dsh-compact seam README's package table and the seam's module doc comment).
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## Model Experience
### System prompt
#### What the model sees
Every request in this plugin's registration scope contains the bash guidance below. A sandboxing executor adds no mode statement or switch notice. Scoped tool restrictions can hide the schemas without removing this independently registered section.
##### Bash guidance
```markdown
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
```
#### Token effect
Small fixed input cost per request while the plugin is active, unchanged by sandbox mode or mode switches.
#### KV Cache effect
Prefix-stable while the registration scope and prompt text are unchanged. Plugin activation or disposal may invalidate reuse from this prompt section; sandbox mode switches do not.
### Tool schemas
#### What the model sees
The model sees the generated [`bash` schema](../../../docs/tool-catalog.md#deepseek-aidsh-tool-bash). `run_in_background` appears only when this producer enables it; `sandbox_permissions` and `justification` appear only when the mounted executor advertises sandboxing. Agent-scoped tool restrictions can remove the definition for that agent.
#### Token effect
Fixed schema cost on every request where the tools are visible; sandbox support adds the escalation fields and its conditional description paragraph.
#### KV Cache effect
Prefix-stable while visibility, background support, and executor sandbox capabilities are unchanged. A restriction, config change, or executor change may invalidate reuse from the first changed tool definition.
### Foreground result
#### What the model sees
The renderer emits the data-dependent stdout tail, then optional `[stderr]` and the stderr tail. With no output it emits exactly `(no output)`. Conditional lines are exactly `[output truncated; full output: <path-or-(unavailable)>]`, `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`, `[timed out after <timeoutMs>ms]`, `[killed by signal: <signal>]`, and `[exit code: <exitCode>]`; the sandbox escalation and runner-failure lines are quoted in [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/README.md).
#### Token effect
Zero result tokens before a call. Output is bounded per stream, while each emitted line remains in history until compaction.
#### KV Cache effect
Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
### Background task context and results
#### What the model sees
Start returns exactly `started background task <taskId>`. This producer supplies incremental process output, optional `[some output was dropped from memory; full output: <paths-or-(unavailable)>]`, sandbox facts, and terminal detail such as `exit code: <exitCode>` or `signal: <signal>` to the generic task runtime. [`dsh-tool-tasks`](../../tasks/tool-tasks/README.md) owns the visible status line, completion notice, listing, and cancellation response.
#### Token effect
The start acknowledgement is small and retained; collected output is data-dependent and bounded by the executor's stream buffers. Consuming reads do not repeat prior output.
#### KV Cache effect
Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
### Tool errors
#### What the model sees
Validation and policy failures are normalized as `Error: <message>`. This package's stable messages are `invalid command: expected a non-empty string`, `invalid description: expected a non-empty string`, `invalid timeoutMs: expected a positive number, got <value>`, `invalid escalation: sandbox_permissions requires a justification`, `invalid escalation: justification is only valid together with sandbox_permissions`, `invalid justification: expected a non-empty sentence`, `background execution is disabled for this bash tool`, `background tasks unavailable: load @deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks and @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks`, `sandbox_permissions is not available in this composition (no sandboxing executor to escalate)`, `sandbox escalation to "<mode>" is not strictly wider than this call's current "<mode>" mode`, the approval-availability/rejection/cancellation variants, and `command aborted`.
#### Token effect
Only the failing call adds these retained tokens; a rejected escalation does not add command output because the command does not run.
#### KV Cache effect
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Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
Add a gated Known Limitations and Deferred Work section to every package README Every packages/*/* README now carries a canonical '## Known Limitations and Deferred Work' section: condensed, evidence-backed bullets for consumer-visible gaps (unimplemented features, platform caveats, MVP cuts) and consciously postponed work (TODO/FIXME/XXX markers, RFC deferrals still open). The ten pre-existing ad-hoc variants ('What is NOT here (TODO)', 'Deferred', 'Limitations (MVP)', 'Known limitations (tracked TODOs)', ...) are normalized into the canonical heading. A new doc-sync gate, scripts/verify-readme-limitations.ts, enforces the shape: exactly one limitations-like heading per package README, byte-equal to the canonical h2, with at least one bullet; near-miss headings fail so variants cannot creep back. Packages with genuinely nothing to declare (dsh-brand, dsh-timeout, dsh-subagent-mock, dsh-app-boot) are whitelisted in the script and must NOT carry the section; whitelist entries are validated against the scanned package set so a rename fails loud. Wired into the doc-sync chain (package.json) and the run-gates doc-sync leaf set; the standing rule lands in packages/AGENTS.md and the adding-a-package cookbook; decision record in docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-10-readme-known-limitations-gate.md (RFC index regenerated). Also fixes two stale '(deferred)' markers claiming dsh-compact-basic is unimplemented (the dsh-compact seam README's package table and the seam's module doc comment).
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **Replay exit pills parse from result text** — output whose final line happens to be exactly `[exit code: N]` / `[killed by signal: …]` shows a wrong pill on session replay; a display-only known residual.
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- **The `bash` tool opts out of `timeout-policy` budgets** — it keeps the executor-owned `BASH_TIMEOUT` path, per [the tool-call timeout-policy Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-07-tool-call-timeout-policy.md).
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/rfc-subagent-background-tasks # Conflicts: # docs/architecture.md # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/bash.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md # docs/rfc/proposed/architecture/2026-06-20-generic-long-running-tool-runtime.md # examples/AGENTS.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.1.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.2.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/coding-agent/cordis.yml # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/mode-switching/session.jsonl # packages/bash/bash-local/README.md # packages/bash/bash-local/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash-local/tests/executor.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.md # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash/README.md # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/types.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/README.md # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/core/agent-core/README.md # packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts # packages/subagent/subagent/README.md # packages/subagent/tool-subagent/README.md # packages/subagent/tool-subagent/src/index.ts # packages/ui/acp-agent/README.md # packages/ui/acp/README.md # packages/ui/stdio-agent/README.md # packages/util/brand/src/index.ts # scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json
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- **Background processes have no executor timeout** — callers must use `task_kill`, or rely on owner/service disposal, when work no longer matters.