deepseek-harness/.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.md

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feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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# Agent Note: Interrogating a draft provider endpoint
Status: implemented
English | [中文](2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.zh.md)
## Problem
Once a pi-ai route became [a declaration rather than a catalog lookup](2026-08-03-pi-ai-declared-provider-catalog.md), a person adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway had to know its model ids before they could configure it. The adapter no longer constrains them to an installed catalog, which is the point, but it also means nothing tells the user what the endpoint actually serves — and most of these endpoints do publish that list at `GET /models`.
The obvious answer, a dynamic runtime catalog refreshed in the background, was rejected with the layer below it: it makes a route's model list external mutable state needing a cache, an invalidation story, and an offline path, while the product need is narrower. What is needed is a *question asked once*, whose answer the user adopts into `settings.yaml` — so `settings.yaml` remains the only thing deciding what a route serves.
The awkward part is that the question is about something that does not exist yet. The provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential; the endpoint and key are values in a form the user is still typing. Every existing LLM Service Definition operation is keyed by a registered provider route, so none of them can carry this.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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## Decision
Interrogation is keyed by **settings namespace**, not by provider route:
fix(host): pin model discovery to loopback and drop its unread wire field llm.discoverModels was reachable from any declared trusted host. The method takes a caller-supplied baseURL and makes the host issue a GET to it, then reports the status or the parsed body — so on a LAN deployment an anonymous caller had a probe for whatever the host can reach and the browser cannot, plus a path that carries a draft credential. The PRIVILEGED_METHODS doc already states the rule this broke: trustedHosts is a DNS-rebinding fence, not authentication, so the configuration plane stays loopback-same-origin. It is in that set now, asserted both against the hand-built fence and over real HTTP beside the catalog reads that deliberately stay reachable. supportsDiscovery and listModelDiscoveryNamespaces are gone. The field was required on the wire and read by nobody: its own contract said a surface should offer the action "instead of naming an adapter family it would have to hardcode", while the surface hardcodes llm-pi-ai in two places and gates the button on whether there is anything to probe. Its shape did not fit the second caller either — the create card has no row to read a per-row field from. Keeping a required field alive for a consumer that may never arrive costs every producer and fixture a value nobody consults, which is exactly how the fixtures drifted. The registry that fed it had no other production consumer, so registration and disposal are now observed through the offer itself. The Agent Note claimed the key is never logged, which the wire schema beside it already contradicts, and predated both the provider field and the catalog-answer path. The two new public types pointed at core.md without a type-equiv block or manifest entry, so the generated service catalog named documentation that did not exist.
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- `ctx.llm.registerModelDiscovery(settingsNs, discover)` lets an adapter plugin offer to interrogate endpoints for the namespace it owns, and `ctx.llm.discoverModels(settingsNs, request)` asks. There is no way to enumerate which namespaces registered: a surface that cannot interrogate learns it from the refusal, and a list nothing consumed would be a required wire field doing nothing. The namespace is the right key because a configuration surface already holds it from the configurable-provider directory, and because a provider being added has no route to name.
- `LlmModelDiscoveryRequest` carries the draft — an optional `provider`, an optional `baseURL`, an optional `api`, an optional `apiKey`, and a signal — and needs at least one of `provider` or `baseURL` to have anything to answer about. `provider` exists because a route the adapter already describes is answered from its own registry with no network call at all; only a route it does not describe reaches an endpoint. Nothing in this path writes settings or credentials. A named configured route reads its stored credential and deployment-owned profile `headers` inside the Host: the credential is write-only and the curated Models page does not edit headers, so neither can be reconstructed from that page's draft. The typed key wins over the stored credential, while the profile headers still accompany the request.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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- `LlmDiscoveredModel` makes every field but `id` optional, because most listings disclose an id and nothing else. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: a surface adopting one still owes the capacities the adapter requires.
- `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its `apiKey` is the third and last payload on which a secret may ride, alongside `settings.update`/`mutate` and `credentials.set`, and it is never stored or echoed back. It does ride the client's outgoing envelope like every other secret-bearing payload, where a `subscribeEnvelopes()` observer can see it; redacting that tap is a configuration-plane-wide change, not this method's to make alone. Connection authenticates the method with the complete Host API: it makes the host issue a GET to a caller-chosen URL and reports the outcome, which an anonymous caller must not receive. Every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, whose message is the adapter's own text and whose details name the endpoint asked but never the credential offered.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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`dsh-llm-pi-ai` implements the wire path as a plain `GET {baseURL}/models`, reading `openai-completions` and `openai-responses`: their `GET /models` shape with bearer auth is the one a gateway, a self-hosted server, and the official endpoints all agree on. Profile resolution rejects names and values Fetch cannot represent, so a malformed deployment header is reported as a configuration error before interrogation. Configured profile headers are installed first; the fixed JSON accept header, a typed-or-stored bearer credential, and Harness attribution then win case-insensitive collisions in that order. Azure is excluded despite its OpenAI lineage — it authenticates with an `api-key` header and requires an `api-version` query — and Codex uses OAuth; both would have reported an authentication failure as a provider with no models. Every other protocol answers `DISCOVERY_UNSUPPORTED`, so the surface falls back to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed response shape as an empty provider. `baseURL` is treated as a prefix rather than a URL to resolve against, so a deployment path such as `https://gateway.example/openai/v1` keeps its segments. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling enforced on the bytes actually received — the endpoint is a URL the user typed, so a declared `content-length` is checked first as a courtesy but never trusted as the bound, matching `dsh-web-fetch`'s two-stage shape for its own caller-supplied URLs.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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### Why not pi-ai's own refresh machinery
pi-ai supplies `createProvider({ fetchModels })` plus `Models.refresh()` and a `ModelsStore`, and the layer below already builds pi-ai `Provider` objects. Routing interrogation through them would have meant constructing a throwaway provider and collection per question, with a store whose entire purpose — persisting a catalog across runs — contradicts the decision that `settings.yaml` owns the catalog. It would also have bought nothing: **no built-in pi-ai provider implements `fetchModels`**, so the HTTP call and its response parsing are this package's code either way. A direct fetch says what is actually happening. The route's stored credential is resolved by the plugin's own per-request resolver, and only on the branch that reaches the network, so a catalog route answers without touching credentials and never fails over one the question did not need.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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## Alternatives considered
**Key interrogation by provider route.** Symmetric with every other LLM Service Definition operation, and it would let the request omit the endpoint. But the case that motivates the feature — adding a provider — has no route, so the operation would only work for providers already configured, which are the ones that need it least.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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**Put the capability on `LlmAdapter`.** Adapters are reached through a route registration, so this has the same problem, plus it would make an adapter instance answer questions about endpoints it does not serve.
**Have the host read the entire stored profile instead of accepting a draft.** No secret would cross the wire for an already-configured provider. But adding a provider would then require saving an unusable configuration first, and a form whose endpoint was edited but not yet saved would silently interrogate the old one. The draft remains authoritative for the endpoint and protocol. The narrow Host-side exceptions are the stored credential, which is write-only, and profile headers, which remain deployment configuration rather than Models-page fields.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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**Interrogate every pi-ai protocol.** Anthropic's listing happens to share OpenAI's envelope, and Google's does not. Supporting the ones that are easy would make coverage arbitrary and, worse, make a wrong guess at a response shape indistinguishable from a provider with no models. A protocol that says it cannot be interrogated sends the user to hand-entry, which is the documented fallback.
**Buffer the reply with `response.text()` and check its length.** Simpler, but the bound would arrive after the bytes did, and the endpoint is whatever URL the user typed.
## Consequences
A person adding a gateway can ask it what it serves instead of hunting through its documentation, and the answer arrives as candidates they choose from rather than as configuration written behind their back. An already-configured enterprise gateway uses the same deployment headers for interrogation and model requests without adding a header injection field to the browser protocol. The seam gained a registry that is deliberately small: one offer per namespace, no storage, no lifecycle beyond the fiber.
feat(llm): interrogate a draft provider endpoint for its models Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup, adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile, and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form. Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace, `discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves. `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored, logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered. The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only — their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
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What it costs: the wire gained a third secret-carrying payload, so the configuration plane's write-only surface is now three methods rather than two. Discovery coverage is protocol-shaped rather than provider-shaped — an Anthropic-compatible gateway must be filled in by hand even though its listing would parse. And because nothing re-runs the question, a model list is still only as current as its last edit; that is the same trade the layer below made deliberately.
## Testing
`packages/llm/llm/tests/topology.spec.ts` covers the registry: one offer per namespace, disposal with the fiber, normalization that drops duplicate and unusable ids without inventing capacities, the `NO_DISCOVERY`/`INVALID_DISCOVERY` refusals, and the `model-discovery-failed` Remote mapping. `packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/discovery.spec.ts` drives the probe against local HTTP servers — a listing with and without disclosed capacities, a preserved deployment path, an absent credential, a configured route supplying its stored credential and headers while a typed key wins without resolving the stored one, a catalog route answering without resolving one at all, dropped rows, 401/403 versus a server fault, a non-listing and a non-JSON body, an unreachable endpoint, caller cancellation, an unsupported protocol, and the size ceiling in both its declared-length and streamed forms. `packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/loader-composition.spec.ts` boots settings and credentials through the Loader and proves settings-only headers reach `GET /models` with request-owned headers winning collisions. `packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/adapter.spec.ts` rejects profile headers Fetch cannot represent, and `packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/dynamic-config.spec.ts` proves a settings write reports that configuration error while its last good routes keep serving. `packages/client/connection/tests/node-half.host.spec.ts` pins the `llm/discoverModels` `/api` carrier registration, while `packages/client/ui-settings-models/tests/provider-form.client.spec.tsx` verifies that the draft reaches the Remote whole, absent fields stay absent, and no settings namespace or credential is written before selection.